OOC

Belated, sure.

UNSC: "UNASUR, Y U NO HAVE PLAN!?!"

UNASUR: "Lol, guyz. When u ever do anything anywayz?"

It's not even the UNSC. It's the UNSC's most obstructive member and the UNSC's most ambivalent member that are demanding UNASUR do something. Kind of ironic, really.

And now Ecuador's complaining of unrealism.

I may just start posting my characters having some strange epiphany where they see pictures in their heads all the time. That aughta do it.

Well, that may have been the most esoteric argument in 21c's UNSC ever.

Now we get to see if China taking a hard line on this helps or hurts Ecuador.

I suspect it will have absolutely no effect whatsoever, as UNASUR is essentially going to implement the sanctions regardless of the UNSC's decision. The UNSC's actions essentially only effect whether anyone else can sell Ecuador arms and little else.

Unless the UNSC approves sanctions, other countries could simply sail into Ecuador. It isn't like UNASUR has legal right to stop shipping -- that's really only something the UNSC can do.

And, for the record, having an NPC nation resort to blatant insults is exceptionally petty. You're better than that.

Not wanting to get into a real debate over it here because I have, quite literally, no dog in this fight, the Chinese veto and general position vis-a-vis that resolution is seriously the most absurd thing I've seen you do as China.

I mean, I realize that my Colombian response was harsh, but there really is nothing more petty than China's grounds for objection there. If I'm better than that, so are you.

I'm vetoing it because the obligation to "review" the sanctions is legally ambiguous. Does that mean that a vote must be held to re-confirm them? Does that mean that a vote must be held to invalidate them? Does that mean that an entirely new resolution must be drafted? Does that mean that sanctions must by definition be expanded or contracted (rather than maintained as-is)? Legal review is not exactly a simple concept.

China's vetoing this because nobody else has considered the legal implications. And if there's anybody that's hypersensitive to legal implications, is the bureaucratic sprawl that is Beijing.

Solely in curiosity, is there any specific vested interest influencing Chinese vetoing?

You mean like attempting to butter up to Ecuador or something? No, not really.

That said, there are some concerns about the 'review' thing. That requires transparency and China is notoriously bad when it comes to transparency.

The concept of reviewing sanctions is intentionally legally ambiguous. By refusing to commit to any long-term policy regarding the arms embargo, it afford the Security Council the latitude to take any actions it deems necessary, to be determined by reviewing the situation, the conditions on the ground, and the developments in Ecuador and the region. Timetables such as that one are ambiguous because leaving the Council's options as wide open as possible is precisely the point. Nobody can predict how the Ecuadorean regime would react to this resolution and UNASUR's actions, and there has been open speculation in the UNASUR emergency summit that there exists a distinct possibility that the junta could react violently, and Chile, to name one party to the UNASUR discussions, has openly entertained the notion that the Correa's safety could be in jeopardy, and more than one member has expressed concern that Ecuador could lash out against its very neighbors in UNASUR. By leaving the options as wide open as possible, Colombia is representing wider UNASUR concerns and interests as the only UNASUR member with a seat on the council.

Alternatively, the military could bow to the pressure and the entire thing could be resolved within a couple of weeks/months. In that case, the council could review the matter in six months and determine that the embargo no longer is necessary.

You keep talking about "legal implications" as though the timeframe does anything whatsoever more than commit the council to revisiting the matter and determining if any further action is necessary. There are no additional legal implications that wouldn't otherwise be there. Consider that without the commitment to revisit the matter in 6 months, there would still be a requirement for the council to reconvene and draft a resolution to lift it. This merely lets the junta know that it has six months to make a decision before the council again revisits the matter.

Seriously, the objection and its basis is so shallow that I really am having trouble understanding why China, of all nations, would be so adamantly opposed.

Except there's no clear indication that the council must lift the sanctions via resolution. Indeed, you (as Colombia) openly used the phrase 'sunset clause.' A sunset clause is an expiration date. It is implied, if not directly stated, that Colombia is proposing the UNSC institute one-off sanctions that automatically expire in six months and must then be reapplied.

China is adamantly opposed because it is legally ambiguous. The UNSC generally does not like (or pass) ambiguous resolutions. China and Russia are especially careful now after the Libya fiasco. The UNSC adopted a somewhat ambiguous resolution and then, in their eyes, NATO promptly bastardized it and used it to justify something they didn't think it justified (ie, the extent of NATO's intervention in the Libyan civil war).

China's requirements are extremely minor: don't be ambiguous. Don't leave the meaning of the sanctions up in the air. That's it. I even drafted that amended resolution (at Colombia's suggestion) that both addressed my concerns, strengthened UNASUR's legal right to act in this matter, and ensured that the Council would remain regularly informed of events. If anyone's being irrational here, it's Colombia.

Re use of phrase 'sunset clause': Definist fallacy. The use of the phrase 'sunset clause' was an example to refute Beijing's basis for veto resting on the fact that the UNSC does not impose time-stipulated sanctions, which I pointed out very clearly that they have and do. Furthermore, even if they hadn't and do not, there's absolutely nothing in the UN Charter that prohibits them. "Sunset clause" was never, ever used in direct reference to the resolution fielded or its wording, and in fact the wording of the resolution explicitly states that the six-month time stipulation calls for the matter to be required to be reviewed. That is entirely different from a sunset clause, expiration date, or any such equivalent mandate to take any action whatsoever. However, it does not rule out any particular action, which is exactly what UNASUR would want the resolution to do; given the perception of the consequences of the resolution to be unpredictable, UNASUR would want any resolution to both mandate that the council revisit the matter in a relatively prompt manner in order to ensure that any developments can be quickly addressed, and avoid excessive restriction of the council's latitude to take further action in response.

Additionally, I find it to be almost comical that Beijing would consider wording that mandates that the council review the matter in a specific window of time to be more ambiguous than a blanket embargo without any guarantee that the council ever go back and revisit the issue. I beg for the logic at work there.

I suppose in terms of international law, that's true. But if UNASUR decides to go ahead and impose a physical embargo regardless of whether the resolution passes, how many nations do you think are going to refuse to comply with UNASUR's blockade, risking outright hostilities with UNASUR nations? I mean, unless a country is willing to escort their shipping vessels, for example, with armed military vessels and risk hostilities with UNASUR nations on their own turf, they'll likely comply just to avoid the hassle. Sure, it might not be legal, but what's the UNSC going to do? They can't even decide on the terms of an arms embargo that everyone agrees should be implemented. :-P

The NPC insults need to stop. It adds nothing of value to the discussion; it just makes the situation considerably more likely to spiral. You know this.

You did no such thing. What you demonstrated is that the UNSC issues sanctions in support of prior negotiations and agreements (which is something no one has ever disputed). The question was whether or not the UNSC issued sanctions with sunset clauses on its own initiative. Because Ecuador =\= the Ivory Coast in the same way that Kosovo =\= South Ossetia, trying to draw direct parallels without regard to context undermines your case. In short, Bogota latched onto a strawman and proceeded to beat it senseless while clearly misunderstanding the stated Chinese position.

Sure. But China doesn't want to set precedent for this because it'll mean countries and organizations become more prone to passing sanctions (albiet in temporary form). And since most of the countries that wind up under sanctions are at least on cordial terms with Beijing, the conclusion is simple: in absolute terms, more sanctions damages China's international standing. It also forces China to make divisive decisions (to veto or not to veto?) more often, which further complicates the Chinese foreign policy.

http://z9.invisionfree.com/21c/index.php?s...post&p=22025385

The term "sunset clause" is first used by you (as Bogota) to justify a mandatory review. We both know what that term means. Bogota then insists upon a legally ambiguous "review" process. Having previously established its intent to argue that sunset clauses are permissible under UN law, it then attempted to argue that a poorly-defined requirement would be a good addition to the resolution. And, when it didn't get that, it threw a goddamn hissy fit and started brazenly insulting the Chinese delegation.

Either Bogota was arguing for the sake of arguing on the sunset clause or it wanted to make that point specifically so it (or UNASUR) could reference it later. If it was the former, China wasn't about to take any shit from a country that is basically the poster child for fucked up Latin American countries. If it was the latter, China wasn't about to be the one who let the UNSC subordinate its authority to UNASUR.

Uh, Ecuador's going to be on the UNSC docket every single month (except the first month). This was your clause. Every month the UNSC is going to have to sit down and hear about Ecuador, review the impact of its sanctions, and determine whether or not another resolution is needed. I also pointed this out ICly.

If you honestly think China's amendments make this issue more ambiguous, you could not possibly be more wrong.

If Colombia's sole intent was to ensure that Ecuador wouldn't be forgotten, the clause that required monthly reports guaranteed this. But since Colombia was so goddamn dead-set on the word "review" being in the sanctions, well... I don't think that was the intent.

Uh, yeah, I think countries would sell arms to Ecuador. Remember the whole Iranian guns in Gaza last year? Countries like Iran and North Korea wouldn't have anything to lose by selling weapons to Ecuador. Countries like China, which has relatively little control over small arms exports (thanks to corruption and poor regulation), would probably see those arms funneled into foreign corporations, which would then sell them to Ecuador.

This amendment just means UNASUR can legally seize that cargo. If it didn't have the UNSC approval on this, the best it could do is turn the ships away (since seizing that cargo would open them to lawsuit... which they'd probably lose).

Admittedly, that last post was having fun with China's apparent thin-skinned indignation. If China's so concerned with what "the poster child for fucked up Latin American countries" thinks of it, then indeed Beijing could use a self-image seminar. :-P

I'm starting to question whether or not we're reading the same post, because I was very clearly refuting your (very broad) assertion that the UNSC does not issue sanctions with time-specific clauses, as the basis of your veto. "Yes, in fact, they do, and here's an example:" was literally the point of that portion of the post. In the context of that post, it makes no difference if the 13 month clause in R.1572 was the result of negotiations or was merely pulled out of some ambassador's ass. You stated insistently that the UNSC did not include such clauses when, in fact, they do. Whatever the circumstances may be or have been, the entirety of the use of the phrase 'sunset clause' was in the context of the broader subject of time-stipulated sanctions. You're putting words in my mouth, and for that matter ignoring the ones that actually come out of my mouth (because that phrase is immediately followed by "or specific timetables after which these sanctions will be reviewed", making your focus on the phrase "sunset clause" misdirected.)

Right, which is why I never did attempt to draw parallels between Ecuador and Cote d'Ivoire except to point out that time-specific sanctions have happened in the past, trivializing objection to them on the basis that they have not happened. I never argued that 1572's clause didn't come about as a result of prior negotiations, because while you seemed to be implying that that fact made 1572 a special case, I considered that fact to be of marginal importance; there is absolutely no reason why those clauses had to come about as the result of prior negotiations. The fact that they happened to in 1572's case was circumstantial and irrelevant. It was you who drew out-of-context parallels between Cote d'Ivoire and Ecuador by incredulously implying later that including such time-specifications would increase the chances that the Ecuadorean resolution would suffer the same fate as the Cote d'Ivoire civil war. (Seriously, Schwer, that was out of left field.)

This may very well be true, but I'm not sure where you're going with it because it's completely irrelevant to your case here: if China had already agreed to sanctions in principle, what difference does it make whether there's a timetable? I understand that sanctions and arms embargoes in and of themselves are something China's generally cautious about, but nowhere did you ever question the embargo itself, but rather a minute detail instead.

There you are putting words in my mouth again: I never said your edit make anything more ambiguous, but rather questioned why you thought your edit make it any less. Here I'm exclusively referring to the removal of the time stipulation, as that's the portion of your edit I rejected. Your elaboration of what an arms embargo constituted was never objectionable. Your edit removing the time stipulation did not 'clarify' or 'disambiguate' anything whatsoever. For the purposes of clarity, it was a net zero. And since you keep mentioning something regarding "ambiguous legal implications" of a time period for reviewing the embargo, I'll preemptively dismiss that notion: requiring the council to review the embargo after six months implied nothing, legally or otherwise except that the Council would be mandated to decide what to do with the embargo in six months: keep it, extend it, terminate it, etc. There are no legal implications involved unless you're aware of some legal use of the term "review" that I'm not.

What, exactly, did you think that the intent was, then? There is no nefarious scheming behind the term 'review', nor anything that I know of happening in six months that would make any impact whatsoever on this situation. To not take the clause at face value is such an odd reaction. If I was fixated on the term "review", it's because I saw you taking such offense to the clause that you'd actually veto what was an otherwise perfectly agreeable resolution. My fixation, admittedly, was the result of what I perceived as your seeming obsession with a detail that seemed so trivial proceeded by your consistent failure to adequately explain what was so objectionable about the clause to compel you to veto it altogether. Even if you thought it was redundant or unnecessary, its inclusion or exclusion doesn't really change anything (which you admitted yourself.) I suppose I'd be guilty of prodding you because your reaction seemed so out of proportion that I presumed you to have some specific reason for wanting it removed so badly. Which of course, you don't; like me, you simply like to argue. :-P

Why would you think that? Ecuador's main arms suppliers are Germany, Brazil, Venezuela, and Israel, with a smattering of stuff from India and South Africa, while China has only begun selling arms to the country very recently. Of these nations, Brazil has already stopped, while India voted in favor of the embargo and Germany can presumably be covered by the French vote (it's improbable that Germany would go to pains to sell Ecuador arms if France and Britain were to impose the embargo.) That leaves Israel and China. Notions of Iran or North Korea selling Ecuador arms is just absurd: first of all, if Iran or Korea wanted to sell Ecuador weapons, it's unlikely to be stopped by a resolution. If UNASUR unilaterally imposed a blockade of arms to Ecuador, neither Iran nor Korea are in a position to battle UNASUR over the right to, nor to defend their cargo from interception. Lastly, the thought that either of those countries would have any reason whatsoever to sell arms to Ecuador, considering just how little Quinto means to either of those countries, is far-fetched at best. Israel selling arms to a country the US would disapprove of arms being sold to without any overriding strategic interest at stake to make it worth the hassle is highly improbable. That leaves China.

If China is willing to stake it's reputation and/or political capital internationally and in Latin America by challenging UNASUR over their interception of illegally smuggled and laundered arms sales to a pariah state, then that's an incredibly foolish idea, but hey, it's your call. Though again your statements fail to satisfy because if corruption or poor regulation is how the arms would get from China to Ecuador, a resolution is going to do little to stop that. It's not going to matter very much, by the way, whether UNASUR can seize the cargo or "merely" turn it away in terms of UNASUR's interests; so long as they're not getting into Ecuador, the effect is the same.

I'm pretty sure that's what we're both doing at this point. We're just both impossibly stubborn for our own good. But it's always good to be able to demonstrate OOC debates that don't turn into flamewars, Colombia's snarky NPC comments aside. (You had to know I wrote all that with my tongue firmly in my cheek just to push your buttons, yeah? :-P)

I genuinely and truly do not give a shit what Colombia thinks. What I have a problem with is when someone NPCs a country and then proceeds to insult a PC because, by virtue of using an NPC, they can dig at other players and be insulated from their antics. That's been abused here before and you know it. That's why for the two or three rounds we've had decorum enforced much more stringently than before.

You're not getting my point. Allow me to repeat it for the eleventh goddamn time: expressing official support and confirming an outside agreement =\= setting legal precedent. The UNSC is not supposed to be the first place you go to solve problems. Article 33 explicitly states that countries should pursue negotiation and arbitration before resorting to the UNSC. France and the involved parties did that. The UNSC, then, is Charter-bound to rubber stamp whatever solution France and company came up. That does not, under any circumstances, mean that the agreement France and company reached should be emulated, should stand as testament to anything, or whatever else Colombia is trying to argue.

Furthermore, you conveniently ignored the second part of my point about that: the Ivory Coast resolution was a complete and utter fuck-up. The conflict exploded again and, by virtue of a neutral party being in the middle, managed to draw France into a war that France was not previously involved in. The conflict then escalated rapidly because France bombed the unholy shit out of the guys who attacked them.

Basically, Beijing's saying that using such a clusterfuck of a resolution outside of context and without regards to what came after it is a terrible idea. Which makes complete sense when you consider how pissy Beijing/Moscow got during Libya, which was another tidbit you didn't really address.

I explained why temporary sanctions do not serve China's strategic interests.

I have argued that the requirement to "review" the sanctions, in light of the Colombian delegate's arguments, was legally ambiguous. If you accept that as fact (which you don't, but stay with me for a minute), you must agree that removing the mentions of an obligatory "review" make the resolution less ambiguous.

And yes, "review" remains legally ambiguous. I explained why above. Here's the short version: nowhere in the resolution does it indicate that the sanctions expire. Nowhere does it indicate that they remain in force. Nowhere does it indicate that they must be reaffirmed or modified. Nowhere does it indicate that a resolution is required (or not required) at the conclusion of the reviewal process. Nowhere is it stipulated what happens if the 6 month timetable passes without another resolution being issued. In short, Dax, nobody knows what the fuck happens after those six months pass unless an involved party (ie, the UNSC) passes another resolution that explicitly details what happens. That is ambiguity.

This line of reasoning implodes once you realize that a country, once sanctioned, starts buying arms from whoever will sell to them. Look at Iran: after the Shah fell, the one other country that operated F-14s was suddenly out of America's good graces. It was sanctioned (to the point where America flat out refused to sell more F-14s abroad). Iran then immediately turns around and starts buying weapons from other countries. Even during blanket international sanctions Iran is still apparently acquiring weapons from countries that will sell to it.

Or we can look at Iraq. In 2002, when no country could legally supply them with parts to their MiGs, Serbia-Montenegro was selling them spares and engines. It was not enough to stave off deterioration, but it's a clear example of a country in desperation turning to whoever would agree to give them guns.

In a situation like this, Ecuador will buy guns from whoever will risk shipping them. This means that whoever decides to take a risk on this could, theoretically, become Ecuador's new arms supplier. I also feel like reminding you that a blockade is legally an act of war. Any UNASUR ships engaging in a blockade of Ecuador without UNSC approval will be legal targets. I somehow doubt UNASUR wants to go to war with one of its members because it failed to acquire international approval.

I think that there may be a failure here to differentiate between criticizing, even strongly or harshly, a nation's policy and a nation itself. Similarly, I feel as though there may be confusion in distinguishing between 'taking a dig' at China and 'taking a dig' at you. As with AaronH and MTTzla elsewhere on the board, that's a distinction that has to be respected, and I certainly hope that you wouldn't (or didn't) misconstrue anything in that thread as having anything to do with you or I, or reflecting on anything other than our routine head-butting. (We're somewhat infamous for it, even if it is much more tame these days than previously.)

No, please don't misunderstand me: I got your point crystal clear, I just think it's completely irrelevant. The R.1572, the agreement between France and Co., and all of the circumstances surrounding the Cote d'Ivoire Civil War are completely and utterly besides the point. The fact that any part of the resolution was influenced or determined by some other agreements is immaterial. Because, (here's the crux of my argument, to make it easier for you when responding :-P) R.1572 proved that the UNSC had the authority to attach any and all stipulations to a sanction that they saw fit, including time-stipulations. The Council had every right to attach that stipulation with or without the prior agreement, and therefore the fact that "for thirteen months" was decided because it reflected a prior agreement means absolutely nothing. This never had anything to do with precedent, because in dredging up that resolution, I was never intending to say, "Look, this is precedent that arms embargoes should have time stipulations!". It can be summarized best thusly:
Colombia: "Let's impose an arms embargo and review it in six months."
China: "Veto. We don't put timetables on sanctions."
Colombia: "Uh, that's not exactly what we're trying to do, but still, we can if we want to. Look, we've done it before so certainly there's nothing stopping us."
That's it. That's the extent that R.1572 had anything to do with this resolution. It wasn't being emulated and it wasn't being held as a model resolution, but rather evidence it's time stipulations proved that it was possible, and therefore the Chinese objection was invalid. Now, it would be one thing if you had said, "China does not believe it would be wise to put a timetable on sanctions." Then we would have had a different conversation. But you didn't. Your initial veto merely stated that it was not something the UNSC did, saying nothing about also thinking it was a bad idea regardless, which is a completely separate objection.

Indeed I did completely ignore that section of your comments, as I should have because they were completely asinine with regards to what we were saying. The resolution's effects on the Cote d'Ivoire civil war had nothing to do with the arms embargo's time stipulation, and even if it did, it's ballsy for you to insinuate that a time stipulation here would yield the same results, A. because Cote d'Ivoire in 2004 and Ecuador in 2012 aren't even remotely comparable by even the most lax and liberal of assessments, and B. the original Colombian wording and R.1574's sunset clause did not aim to accomplish the same objectives: 1574 set a clear sunset clause on the sanctions, R.2060 would have aimed only to mandate the council revisit the sanctions in six months, and made crystal clear that they intended to. I was under the impression that your continued talk about how much of a failure 1574 amounted to was merely rhetoric attempting to discredit my argument using a logical fallacy (because that's exactly what it would have been, since Colombia wasn't in any way using it as a guide of how to address Ecuador.)
I can see that we're going to go back and forth on this, however, so lets agree that it's ultimately pretty irrelevant at this point. Now we're both just clarifying, elaborating, and repeating ourselves; in a word, debating, which is fine as long as we don't let it hold up continued action.

I would argue that you're extensively exaggerating the extent of "ambiguity" in a review process. If the UNSC passes sanctions on Ecuador and in the process says that the sanctions come under review in six months, then I think that legal mechanics would dictate how the process plays out: sanctions adopted, review conducted six months later, UNSC makes a decision what to do. It's illogical for the initial resolution to express whether they would remain or expire, because that would naturally be dependent on the conclusions of the review. Now, the tricky part apparently is in the unlikely event of no decision being reached at the formal review. However, if we are to follow your own conclusions above and indeed the initial resolution does not indicate that they expire, then they would legally be considered in force. That's only ambiguous if one is ignorant how a legal system operates.

The Chinese edit neither indicated how long they'd be enforced, when they would expire, or really anything happening unless another resolution is issued. Furthermore, you additionally argue that by virtue of the requirement for a monthly report, the sanctions are de facto reviewed monthly (and there's nothing more ambiguous than de facto laws.) However, there is no effective difference in ambiguity between the Colombian and Chinese resolution, as neither specify anything other than the embargo's placement and reviews of the situation at various intervals. Colombia's added an additional six-month clause; China's didn't. The effective distinction is superficial. Now, I could understand if you were using this as a basis for objection in-character because it might be enough to get your way without having to come out and say, "Sanctions do not serve China's interests and we attempt to make adopting them as stringent as possible," making China look bad. If that's the case, fine, but here in OOC, let's both recognize that the ambiguity argument is a profoundly weak one.

The line of reasoning would implode upon that realization if the line of reasoning rested upon the notion that Ecuador wouldn't attempt to circumvent the embargo, because as you've outlined above, it almost certainly would. Luckily for the line of reasoning, it doesn't rest on that assumption. Rather, it rests on the idea that there would be scant interest from many nations in supplying Ecuador with weapons, and anyone who may isn't likely to have the capacity to do so. This is especially true when you consider that Rafael Correa was a friend and quasi-ally to the rogue states that you mention (indeed, Correa flaunted his hosting of Ahmadinejad just earlier this year, and is part of an anti-US axis that befriends all of those rogue states you mention.) I cannot name a single country, in fact, that might be willing to arm Ecuador except -- and this is the grandest irony -- the United States and the west. With that off the table, I think you're overemphasizing something with a likelihood near zero.

Anyway, even if we were to assume that someone, somewhere would, you talk about legal targets as though that's inevitable; with no one of any significance backing the military junta, who exactly do you envision taking the combined weight of UNASUR on legally and, by default and more importantly, diplomatically? Hell, Israel's blockade of Gaza is considered illegal by most nations of the world, and yet not a single entity has stepped up and succeeded in anything but the most impotent of rulings against Israel. Taking a nation, nevermind an entire continent, to court accusing it essentially of illegal warfare is a politically weighty move that is not taken lightly.

Anyway, this is all just postulating anyway, as there's no indication that UNASUR plans to enforce a blockade outside of the UNSC, and the argument in the UNSC has been squashed, paving the way for its passage.

*breaks out popcorn*

The only reason we are talking about a maritime blockade is because in the additional protocol to the UNASUR's Constitutive Treaty states that limiting trade can be implemented as a measure in response to a member state having its democratic order threatened or breached. Every member of UNASUR signed this protocol in 2010. So, when the coup happened in Ecuador, they broke this part of the treaty and under international law gives us a legal right to sanction them in whatever way the protocol allows us to.

I've no idea why Jordan and Tunisia of all countries think they can force America's hand in the UNSC to support their resolution and general disposition. In the UNSC, America wields unbridled power (and regularly flaunts it obscenely in resolutions viz. Israel). Using that as a forum to criticize American policy and attempt to limit Washington's control over Syrian affairs is utterly silly.

At least in bilateral or multilateral talks the airs would be calmed substantially by the lack of a public forum for grandstanding and America wouldn't hold a veto. Pissing off a country which figures it has carte blanche to do whatever it wants in the Middle East (like arming and supporting dangerous policies on both sides of the Israeli-Arab divide, or just flat out bombing countries into submission) in a body where it is so powerful is utterly ridiculous.

I'm not trying to spark an OOC debate here, really. But who honestly thought it was a good idea to mass forces on the border with Syria, come to the UNSC, guarantee the sovereignty of the Assad regime, and then tell the US it shouldn't do anything if Assad snaps and does something stupid regarding Turkey? That's asking for a dressing down.

Morocco*, not Tunisia.

Anyway, this is fun to read, though. For once, Washington did Moscow and Beijing's work for them. By all calculations, Washington should have jumped at the opportunity to authorize a Saudi-led force in Syria, considering how badly Saudi Arabia wants Assad gone, just like America.

If this was George Bush, he would have lauded the Arab resolution, then staged an attack in Turkey by Assad's forces and watched the place burn. Sometimes he was useful to have around.

Ah, sorry.

Well, it isn't that simple. One: Assad has been both relatively tame towards Israel (compared to potential successors), and he has cooperated with US counterterrorism efforts before. I don't like him either, but, better the devil you know.

In any event, this might be a case where Moscow, Beijing, Washington, and, by the looks of things, London, all converge. While it would be nice to have American regional puppets do some of the American dirty work, there are the above problems I mentioned.

Plus, the shots at the United States. You don't come to the UNSC and brazenly take swipes at American or Russian, for that matter (obstructionist members one and two) foreign policy and come away smiling. If it had been as simple as, "we can assuage international fears" or "yes, NATO exceptionalism will be respected" or even "no, we don't think a defence of Turkey is unreasonable;" then yeah, maybe.

Taking it as an opportunity to "score defiance points" isn't going to fly. Besides, it isn't like Sunni Kingdoms have a whole lot of options. We arm them, we prevent Israel from harassing them, and we go to outrageous lengths to vilify Shia states. Considering (as I think Jordan's news thread itself pointed out) those autocracies have already shown their age in Egypt and Tunisia, a change of strategy, under extreme circumstances, isn't unthinkable. Besides, Iran and Iraq have greater economic potential than Saudi Arabia or whoever happens to be the next richest Arab state (UAE?) anyways.

In any event, its going to be quite interesting to see what emerges from this mess.

I think it's exceptionally dangerous to assume that Beijing is in your corner just because Wang took potshots at the Arab League. I've been very careful to keep my options open. If I have more to gain by backing the Arab League, I'll do so. It's not like Sino-American relations are good.

But I agree that seeing this play out will be very interesting.

I'm not counting on anything of the sort. Merely pointing out that the Arab leagues proposal was universally unpopular.

The Sunni Arab governments are American puppets (and its not like the US doesn't have other pitbulls in the region) and it'll take a while to get out of that shadow. I'm not even opposed the Arab league taking a more proactive role. I would support that. But that involves not threatening NATO's collective defence principle, presenting ambiguous armed fronts (since that tends to end up in a "let's go to war with Israel" deal), and openly questioning (some admittedly silly) American foreign policy at random (Georgia?).

Playing diplomatic chicken with any of the P5 in that hall is a fool's errand (which is precisely why in the Cold War the US and USSR avoided discussions and resolutions about each other's immediate actions, like Afghanistan).