OOC

OOC Discussion.

Oh NATO always sticking your fingers in everybody else's business.

Without the Soviet Union to combat, we need something to justify all those meetings.

they're still around they just changed their name

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbOrt1grRrI

Y'all should reform NATO into the Global Defense Initiative!

lol GDI is what UN peace keeping shoulda been

lol GDI is what UN peace keeping shoulda been

*cough*Korea*cough*

Where in the nine hells did NATO get the idea to conduct ground operations in Syria? The FSA would lose its shit. NATO would be getting shot at by both sides.

If y'all really wanted to talk about NATO in Syria, you should've invited the SNC. I wouldn't expect the FSA or SNC to be terribly welcoming to NATO after NATO's spent all this time doing its level best to pretend Syria doesn't exist.

lol GDI is what UN peace keeping shoulda been

*cough*Korea*cough*

The one place I don't want them interfering!

Hmmm. Do it.

I must admit that confused me as well. When I was talking about intervention I was thinking Libya style; aircraft, naval launched helicopters and that.

I must admit that confused me as well. When I was talking about intervention I was thinking Libya style; aircraft, naval launched helicopters and that.

I was more speaking in what if's and i dont think i directly mentioned boots in Syria

I must admit that confused me as well. When I was talking about intervention I was thinking Libya style; aircraft, naval launched helicopters and that.

I was more speaking in what if's and i dont think i directly mentioned boots in Syria

I would hope not. The Canadian public is already furious about Afghanistan and a NATO invasion of Syria would be extremely bloody. Besides, if 'Murrica isn't down for war, NATO ain't down for war.

In fact, I explicitly mentioned Libya as an example of the action that would be taken.

Yall be wasting your time. Father Russia says no, now behave kiddies.
You don't want to see mommy America and father Russia have a domestic..

With the US and Russia going against each other, maybe Europe will rise again.

Or it will just make the rise of the East that much faster.

Have you ever heard of the child winning when parents go through a divorce?

Didn't think so. :-P

Except that the divorce will happen in Europe haha

Okay, NATO. Here's what you should be focusing on.

1. Who you acknowledge as the Syrian government. There's no consensus among NATO members, let alone an actual NATO policy on the matter.
2. Figure out how you're going to deal with the steady influx of arms into Syria. Especially arms going to the side you don't like.
3. Make some limp-wristed resolution saying you support Turkey while simultaneously pretending Turkey hasn't already given its military permission to invade Syria.
4. Figure out how to get Russia/China on the same page.
5. Figure out a post-war plan.

Do all this before you spend IRL days talking about shit you all agree on. Nobody's going to say "no, we didn't agree to this earlier, let's talk about it" if Assad gasses a bunch of Turkish border guards. The "red lines" don't need to be made clear because everyone knows what they are already.

You're obviously ignoring the incompetence of diplomats, Schwer!

No kidding, Schwer! What a killjoy for our pointless NATO Summit negotiations! Demanding competence? Tell me, how much fun would RPing international conferences be if it was competent, efficient, and focused? Nary a laugh to be had, I'll say! :-P

But on a serious note, it's not quite that simple as you portray it.

1. Figuring out who we acknowledge as the Syrian "legitimate" government isn't going to get us anywhere. As of now, only France and Libya actually recognize the SNC as the "sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people", but frankly, even if all of NATO recognized the SNC in the same manner, that does nothing but allow any leverage the west may have with nations like Russia and China to slip away. Refusing to recognize Al-Assad in any capacity whatsoever would simply undermine any future negotiating position. Furthermore, considering the Syrian National Council is but one of a spectrum of "official" opposition groups in Syria, recognizing them before they've done anything whatsoever to unite the country - much less prove that it's actually capable of governing - would just alienate other critical groups such as the Kurds. Nevermind the fact that unless the SNC is recognized in such a manner by the United Nations, it means precisely nothing when it comes to solving the problem through that agency (which will be required, ultimately.)

Besides, recognition of the SNC does nothing for the tactical situation on the ground, because even though recognition allows some nations to send lethal arms under respective domestic laws, the SNC does not have a standing military structure. The Free Syrian Army is not officially under the SNC's direct authority, and in fact we don't even know for sure what comprises the FSA or whom exactly we're arming in such a scenario. Which brings us to...

2. Simply put, we can't. As I said in the thread, there's no practical way to stop the flow of arms into Syria, whether from Iran or Russia; Saudi Arabia or Qatar or Iraq. It sounds nice, but it's practically impossible without taking drastic steps like blockading Syria and imposing some sort of unilateral control over its borders, which is a really long-winded way of saying an occupation. And even then it's not a guarantee. This is especially true when you have Russia saying it'll deploy SAMs to Syria if NATO deploys Patriots to Turkey. Without Russia's at least implicit cooperation, none of it is realistic, which brings us back to the above. Until then, it's a war of attrition and all we can do is play the same game they're playing and hope our side wins.

3. Meh.

4. This is the part we should be focusing on. I just have my doubts that NATO is going to be able to come to a consensus on how to do it.

Ugh. If you guys really want to run a feel-good meeting, that's fine. Just don't be surprised when it's 2014 and you still haven't gotten anywhere meaningful. Diplomats IRL can rely on fluff and filler because they're not working on a timeline that says 7 days = 3 months. But I suppose a good deal of my frustration with that approach is I don't have enough time to spare for the politicking myself.

So let's go issue by issue.

Recognition
Recognizing the SNC isn't going to antagonize the Kurds. The PYD wants to be an autonomous region. That's something it can only get under the SNC -- Assad doesn't even let them form a political party, much less an autonomous region. The SNDC isn't going to be acceptable to the West because all they want is a different Assad in charge. Neither the SNC nor FSA actually recognize the NCC as a legitimate opposition force (both regard it as an arm of the government), so it's not going to factor into post-war negotiations at all. The only party you'd really alienate by recognizing the SNC is the SRGC, which is pretty much a hardline opposition group that doesn't even want to consider figuring out how the post-war government will look until Assad's gone. And the SRGC has fairly limited power compared to the SNC.

The SNC's the only real choice at this point. It also has international recognition (including a country both in NATO and among the P5, no less), which none of the other opposition forces have. Moreover, Russia and China aren't stupid. They're not going to see NATO's decision to back the SNC as a scorched earth policy. China would sell Assad down the river in a heartbeat if it meant meaningful gain and Russia isn't much better. I'd tell you what Russia wants, but I'm going to send the SNC after them next. If the SNC manages to sway Russia, it's basically over. And if NATO hasn't done anything meaningful by then, NATO's fucked when it comes to post-war relations and reconstruction contracts.

FSA
Well, yeah. Your points here are perfectly valid. But, and let's be realistic here, Riad al-Assad isn't turning to Islamists because he wants to. He's turning to them because he needs to -- because there's absolutely no other choice. Similarly, the FSA's climbing into bed with Saudi Arabia because -- again -- nobody else is willing to support them. If the status quo doesn't change, the FSA will be reliant upon Saudi oil sheikhs and Islamists.

In other words, NATO's fears constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy. Be proactive, not reactive.

Arms
This is a problem that requires lateral thinking. Your options aren't only "accept it as inevitable" and "occupy Syria." But since telling you how to stop arms flowing into Syria will completely upend the balance of power, I'm just going to close with this remark: NATO has four chips to play. They are, in order of relevance, political support and financing, arms, intelligence, and Great Power politicking. You want guys sympathetic to NATO to win this? You have to actually make the push.

If the FSA manages to break the SAR's back, the next tug-of-war will be political. If you want to win the political struggle and be the kingmaker, so to speak, you need to get involved sooner rather than later. I'm perfectly willing to whore Syria out to other foreign powers if absolutely necessary, but NATO really should not underestimate the value of another strong ally in the region.

I have some fundamental disagreements with your assessment of both the Syrian internal dynamic and the international community's perception of the conflict, but at risk of getting involved in a larger debate about Syria, I'll stick only to the western perception (and particularly that of Turkey and the US, which are the most critical players in the western camp). I don't want to tell you how to play Syria, but I think that several things need to be understood on both of our ends regarding the unsavory (and sometimes conflicting) mix of pragmatism and ideology that is the foundation of Middle Eastern politics.

For one thing, I disagree entirely with your perception of the Kurdish component vis-a-vis the SNC. The Kurdish element in this conflict is perhaps the most complicated one, and The Kurdish Question is almost guaranteed to be the dominant issue in the eventual peace settlement (and for the sake of a great RP angle, I certainly hope it is here!) For starters, yes, outright recognition of the SNC would alienate the Kurds. The Kurds are not in bed with the SNC, and there is an immense amount of distrust between the Sunni Arab SNC and the Kurds. Lip service about granting the Kurds an autonomous region by the SNC is almost entirely meant to appease the West. But the reality is that there is a very, very long precedent in this region that dictates that Kurds have it way worse under Sunni Arabs than they do under the rule of other minorities. The way that this usually works is that Kurds enjoy some limited, tolerated, de facto autonomy until they try to actually assert themselves. Then they're crushed. This was the case in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey all under officially secular leaders (Ataturk-present, Saddam, Assad) as well as Islamist ones (Khomeini, AKP). There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the Kurds would have it better post-Assad, and a mountain of evidence to the contrary.

And even if you dispute that and fully intend for the SNC to be more accepting and appeasing to the Kurds, a la post-war Iraq, as a matter of pragmatism, what makes this particular component so fascinating to watch unfold in the post-Assad environment is that Turkey has thus far explicitly opposed any Kurdish autonomy in Syria after the fall. And considering Turkey is the SNC's most direct, primary benefactor, that's not an easy matter to dismiss. This isn't like post-Saddam Iraq, where the United States was in charge of the country's administration and constitution drafting and Turkey wasn't able to vocally or physically oppose the creation of the KRG. Turkey has not at all been shy about taking matters into its own hands to stop the Kurds from operating independently on its borders, whether in Iraq or Syria. The power struggle for the Kurdish status post-Assad is far from decided, and I believe it hasn't even begun really. But I digress; that's a matter for after Assad's departure.

The entire notion of the Syrian National Council appealing to Russia for acceptance in the absence of the west's immediate, unconditional recognition is laughably absurd. Not only would Russia categorically dismiss the SNC's overtures if they so much as held a shred of belief that Assad could still maintain power (which they currently do), but the entire concept of the SNC appealing to Bashar al-Assad's most powerful primary material and political supporter is ridiculous. Again, I certainly don't want to tell you how to play Syria, but I will say that going to Russia for support directly on the heels of their announcement that they'll supply Assad with advanced air defenses to protect it from any intervention, while Russia supplies Assad with weapons and prints Syrian currency in order to keep the economy afloat is among the most unwise courses of action that I have ever heard proposed. You mention that the SNC peddles the support of Saudi Arabia and other hardline Islamists because no one else is willing to: tell me, if the SNC had the stomach to, and thought they had a chance in hell of succeeding in getting Russian support, why would they turn the Islamists? Answer: they don't have the stomach, nor do they believe that it's remotely plausible.

So in short, threats about accepting Russian patronage falls on deaf ears in the west. But those aren't the only reasons. The more important reasons are because the west is aware that they stand to lose absolutely nothing by the SNC accepting Russian patronage. If anything, it hastens Assad's fall. The worst possible plausible outcome in that scenario is that we're back to where we were before the revolution, which at least Israel has said it would prefer to the SNC. Remember, for the United States at least, it's not Russian influence in Syria that we give a damn about, but Iranian. And considering that the only scenario more absurd than a SNC-Russian partnership is an SNC-Iranian one, it's a net gain either way. Once again, so long as Assad falls, it's a lose-lose for Iran, which is who we're truly concerned about.

But that doesn't mean that the United States is interested in hastening Assad's fall by any means necessary, including premature and hasty recognition of the SNC and arming of the FSA. Syria is not Libya, and Assad isn't Gudaffi. As the situation currently stands, Bashar al-Assad is so weakened and tied up that he can't do anything meaningful outside of Syria, and thus by proxy, Iran's hand in the Levant is momentarily tied. This is a beneficial temporary state, because it costs us nothing and achieves the strategic goal of cockblocking Iran -- at least for the time being. But, with one eye on the significantly more important and much more strategically problematic countries of Iraq and Lebanon, what we can't afford to risk is an ethnic and religious civil war in Syria once Assad's removed from power. That is exactly what happened in the almost-identical-but-far-more-important Iraq, and those fires haven't died. An ethno-religious civil war in Syria means that there's likely to be a civil war in Iraq and Lebanon along the same ethno-religious lines, and that is unacceptable. Therefore, we have to be careful with the amount of political leverage and firepower we give the FSA and SNC until both of those entities are able to unite and gain the support of enough of Syria's cross-sections of society. Right now, all of these groups and ethnicities are nominally united in an uncomfortable alliance against a common enemy (such as they were in Iraq before Saddam's fall), but to think that the alliance would remain after Assad's fall is fantasy without a fundamental evolution of the SNC's composition and capabilities to govern effectively and fairly.

That's where you need to get if you want more than symbolic, meaningless unilateral recognition (France's recognition means precisely diddly-squat, by the way.) And right now, you aren't there. Our job -- I repeatedly said in the NATO thread that the Syria civil war requires a political solution, and I wasn't talking about negotiations between Ba'athist officials and the SNC -- is to help the SNC get there, and to make sure the FSA doesn't become the Taliban 2.0. Forget reconstruction contracts; Syria's over 70% desert wasteland. And no, Syria's not strategically significant enough in the region to require a friendly regime there. It's guaranteed to be anti-Iran, and that's what counts. The rest is a problem for the countries in the region, not the United States. Post-Assad Syria is going to be so weak for so long that in the medium term, they'll be little threat in and of themselves regardless of which way the chips fall.

they're still around they just changed their name

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbOrt1grRrI

i love you. ive been looking for this clip forever