Armed Forces of the Federal Kingdom of Libya

[Libya (AaronH)]

The role of the military of the Federal Kingdom of Libya is currently fulfilled by the National Liberation Army. This force consists of huge numbers of former rebel fighters and members of militias alongside elements of the former Libyan Military of Gaddafi. With a hugely unreliable command and control structure and no formal delineation between the different branches of the military the lack of ability of the current system was shown during the 2015 social conflict. It is widely expected that the new . government under Mustafa Abdul Jalil shall work quickly to bring about a military 'White Paper' to outline the future structure and modernisation efforts of the Libyan military.

[Libya (AaronH)]

[OOC: This document will be expanded and detailed as I hammer out contracts and agreements and decide upon a general strategy.]

Document Dealing with the Restructure and Modernisation of the Libyan Federal Armed Forces

This document formulated and written in 2016 will deal with the ongoing mission to reform and recreate the Libyan Armed Forces into an effective and modern force. This document will detail the plans for the recreation of separate service branches, the command structure for such and the future plans for procurement and training of each. Furthermore a broad mission statement and modernisation policy shall outlined to encompass the immediate plans for the Libyan Federal Military from 2016 until 2024.

Contents:

I. On the Creation of Separate Service Branches
II. On the purpose and mission of the Libyan Federal Armed Forces
III. On the structure and reform of the Libyan Federal Army
IV. On the structure and reform of the Libyan Federal Air Force
V. On the structure and reform of the Libyan Federal Navy

[Libya (AaronH)]

Current Status of the National Liberation Army:

On the Size and Make-Up of the NLA:

At the opening of 2016 the National Liberation Army spans a rough size of 250,000 on its direct payroll. This number does not take into account militia groups which have maintained resistance to formal integration into the government military. To date the NLA has been operating out of two different levels of facility. The first type of facility has been jury rigged command and control centres often based outside of major cities and towns excluding the Cyreneica province. These facilities have proved to be wholly insufficient for the significant strain placed upon them by the needs of taking up the reins of the protection of the whole Federal Kingdom. As such in the near future the NLA must start moving towards the transitioning towards the rebuilding/re-purposing suitable facilities in the western provinces. This will include but is not limited to former Gaddafi Regime military bases.

The second level of command and control assets were those in the eastern provinces. Being as this was the area with the highest defection percentage coupled with its status as the centre of the rebellion against Gaddafi many more facilities in the region were captured intact and many have been reorganised and used by NLA operations. However, despite the higher level of quality of these facilities many lack in basic quality including but not limited to the maintenance/restoration of much of the military equipment stored upon them. Thus this should be marked as a second high priority target for the short term move from NLA to LFAF.

A further analysis of the NLA reveals a startling lack of formal defined command structure. This lack can be blamed upon two major roadblocks, the first being the problems inherent within a force made up of upwards of 70 different militia groups each with their own commander and little to no military training. Alongside this has been the nature of the state within which the NLA has been to date, operating. With the lack of a formally elected government and the constant outbreak of tensions and civil conflict there has not been any clearly defined head to the armed services and thus the structure has remained localised and undefined. Some portion of this problem can also be assigned to aforementioned command and control deficiencies.

Thus to move forwards with the intention of reforming into an effective and regionally modern/competitive force decisive action must initially be made to improve the basic and fundamental flaws within the current system before any huge equipment purchases or training deals can be worked out. As such the intention will be to reduce the size of the standing ground forces personnel to be limited to no more 120,000 active personnel in the central military command with upper limits of 80,000 to be placed on the soon to be formed state guards. This number shall allow for regional parity without sacrificing on quality of training which it is thought should follow the 4-8-12 formula of training with these signifying the different length training programmes for basic, intermediate and specialist roles within the military. The size and make-up of the naval and air force shall be dependent upon equipment availability and upkeep needs and thus shall be defined at a later date

On the Current Equipment of the NLA:

TBC