South Korea Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Korea

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Minister of National Defence: Kim Kwan-jin
Vice Minister of National Defence: Lee Young-geol

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Jeong Seung-jo
Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Army: General Kim Sang-Ki
Chief of Naval Operations of the Republic of Korea Navy: Admiral Kim Sung-Chan
Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea Air Force: General Park Jong-Heon

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Republic of Korea Army
Total personnel: 520,000

Main Battle Tanks
K1 MBT: 1,027
K1A1 MBT: 484
K2 Black Panther: 300 (100 on order)
M48A3/A3K: 380 (Phased out at a rate of 100 per year from 2018)
M48A5/A5K: 500 (Phased out at a rate of 100 per year from 2018)
T-80U: 33
T-80UK: 2

Armoured Fighting Vehicles/Armoured Personnel Carriers
K200/A1: 1,700
K21: 650 (250 on order)
KAAV7A1: 190
BMP-3: 70
M113: 400 (In Reserve)

Field Artillery
KH174: 24
KH175: 1,000
KM101A1: 700
M101: 2,300 (1,000 kept in storage/reserve)
M114: 850 (In Reserve)

Self-Propelled Artillery
K9 Thunder: 932 (204 extra to be delivered by 2018)
K10 ARV: 179
K55/K55A1: 1,042
M107: 100 (In Reserve)
K532: 500

Rocket Artillery
K136/A1: 156 (140,000 K-30 missile, 340,000 K-33 missile)
M270: 58

Surface-to-Surface Missiles
(To be completed)

Air Defence
(To be completed)

Aircraft
UH-1H/N: 129 (Retired at a rate of 40 per year, 2016-2019)
UH-60P: 140
UH-60M: 30
CH-47D: 23
CH-47F: 15
MH-47G: 4
KAI Surion: 145 (a further 100 to be delivered – to replace UH-1)
MD-500: 257
AH-1F: 90
AH-60L: 10
Bo-105: 12
AH-64D Block III: 10 (5 per year from 2015 - 10 remaining on order)

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Republic of Korea Navy
Total Personnel: 68,000 (including 27,000 Marines)

Destroyers
Kwanggaeto the Great class: 3
Chungmugong Yi Sunshin class: 6
Sejong the Great class: 5 (2 on order; commissioned 2018 and 2020)

Frigates
Ulsan class: 9
Incheon class: 8 (6 more ordered)

Submarines
Chang Boko class: 9
Sohn Wonyil class: 7 (2 more to be commissioned by 2018)
Dolgorae class midget sub: 2

Patrol
Pohang class corvette: 21
Gumdoksuri class patrol vessel: 25 (35 planned in total)
Chamsuri class patrol vessel: 55 (being phased out)

Helicopter Carrier
Dokdo class: 2 (2 on order; commissioned 2018 and 2020)

Amphibious
Go Jun Bong class: 4
Solgae class: 5

Minelayer
Wonsan class: 1

Minesweeper
Ganggyeong class: 6
Yangyang class: 3

Support Vessels
Cheonghaejin class: 1
Berlin class AOR: 2 (Delivered 2017 and 2018)

Aircraft
P-3C Orion: 16
F406 Caravan II: 5
P-8A: 5 (Delivered Q4 2016)

Helicopters
Lynx ASW: 23
UH-60P: 7
UH-1H: 13

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Republic of Korea Air Force
Total Personnel: 65,000

Combat Aircraft
F-35A: 60 (9 per year, 2015-2022)
F-15K Slam Eagle: 61
FA-50 Golden Eagle: 20
F-16: 118 (plus 51 fighter/trainers)
F-4 Phantom II: 68 (To be retired from 2020)
F-5E/F Tiger II: 170 (To be retired from 2019)

Transport Aircraft
Avro 748: 2
C-17A: 4
Boeing 737-300: 1
Boeing 747-400: 1
CASA CN-235: 20
C-130: 12 (8 C-130-H, 4 C-130H-30)
C-130J: 8
C-130J-30: 9

Reconnaissance Aircraft
BAe 125 Hawker 800: 8 (4 recon variant, 4 SIGINT variant)
RF-4C: 16
KA-1 Woongbi: 20
Boeing 737 AEW&C: 4

Aerial Refuelling
KC-130J: 6

Helicopters
UH-1: 18 (13 UH-1H, 5 UH-1N)
CH-47D: 6 (HH-47D variant)
HH-60: 10
S-92A Superhawk: 3
Ka-32T: 7
AS 532: 3

Air Defences
MIM-104D: 6 batteries
MIM-23 Hawk XXI: 24 batteries

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Current Deployments

Army
Haiti: 238 (law enforcement/reconstruction)
Lebanon: 359 (peacekeeping)
Somalia: 304 (peacekeeping)
United Arab Emirates: 147 (special forces trainer/joint exercises)

Navy
Anti-piracy patrol (Horn of Africa): 1 Destroyer and a detachment of Marines on rotation as part of Combined Task Force 151

Air Force
None

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Preparations for Wartime Operational Control
Q2 2015 [SIC]

The Republic of Korea is set to assume full wartime operational control over its armed forces from the joint RoK-US Combined Forces Command on 1 December 2015. From this date, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces will be fully responsible for the conduct of any conflict and will answer directly to the President of the Republic. Preparations for the handover have been under way for a number of years, and the RoK's military has been thoroughly modernised to ensure that a cohesive, well-trained and well-equipped fighting force is available to defend our nation.

The handover of wartime operational control will coincide with the withdrawal of a significant proportion of the 28,500 US military personnel currently stationed in South Korea, as outlined by the Paul Administration in 2013. The RoK Government therefore faces an entirely new situation; it is, in effect, responsible for its own defence and cannot count on any significant levels of US support in the event of another conflict with the North.

Large-scale military exercises are planned to operate throughout the course of 2015 to test the readiness of each branch of the RoK Armed Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will also hold several conferences to assess the progress of the preparations and make any necessary adjustments, subject to the approval of the President. Since 2008, the RoK-US Combined Forces Command has held a series of exercises and computer simulations to train RoK officers and certify that the new command structure will be viable and effective.

Pre-prepared OPLANS (military operation plans), jointly developed with the United States, will be re-examined and modified accordingly to assume that only Korean forces will be available to carry them out. Of particular concern will be those OPLANS dealing with a conflict with North Korea and its aftermath, and a sudden collapse of the regime in Pyongyang.

The defence procurement budget to 2020 will be focused on purchasing a number of systems to enhance the RoK's capabilities, especially in terms of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

South Korean Preparations for the North Korean SLBM Test
Q2 2015 [SIC]

SitRep
North Korean media has announced that the DPRK intends to test launch a BM25 Musudan (Taepodong X) intermediate range ballistic missile from a Type 033 SSK, the Chinese copy of the 1950s-vintage Romeo submarine of the Soviet Union.

The proposed trajectory of the missile sees a launch being made from the East China Sea, with the missile passing over Taiwan and landing at an undisclosed location in the South China Sea. This indicates a flight path of approximately 2,000km - 2,500km if the test is deemed to be a success.

Preparations
The RoK Armed Forces/National Intelligence Service have been ordered to make the following preparations:
- Increased surveillance (including via satellite) of North Korea's military bases/ports on the western coast to determine the location of the missile, the vessel on which it will be carried and any other relevant data;
- The availability of a pair of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft at all times to sweep the East China Sea and track the North Korean submarine;
- The availability of a pair of submarines from the RoK Navy for use in the East China Sea;
- An increased alert level of all armed forces personnel, and initial preparations for calling up reserves will be put into place;
- Radars will be on standby to detect the launch and attempt to track the path of the missile;
- A task force consisting of the RoKS Chung Haejin and the RoKS Dokdo, escorted by the RoKS Dae Jo-yeong, RoKS Eulji Mundeok, RoKS Jeonnam and the RoKS Busan are to prepare to steam to the South China Sea to conduct a salvage operation of the North Korean missile if its landing site can be established. The Philippine Government has granted the RoK Navy permission to use facilities in Subic Bay as a base of operations for the search.

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Naval Task Force Departs for Philippines
Q3 2012

A naval task force led by the RoKS Dokdo, an amphibious assault ship, has set sail for the Philippines to begin efforts to salvage North Korean missile debris for study. The Dokdo will be accompanied by the underwater recovery vessel RoKS Chung Haejin and four destroyers and frigates.

"Our aim is to detect and recover as many significant parts of the missile as possible," said Admiral Kim Sung-Chan, the Chief of Naval Operations. "We intend to study these to see if they reveal anything about the missile's design and capabilities."

The Foreign Ministry has announced that a Visiting Forces Agreement was agreed with Manila earlier this year to ensure that the RoK Navy could utilise Filipino facilities as a base of operations.

The missile parts recovered will be returned to the shore via helicopter, after which they will be flown back to South Korea for analysis.

[South Korea (Farrfin)]

Defence Reform 2020: Getting Back on Track
Q4 2015

Defence Reform Plan 2020 (DRP 2020) was a plan originally put into place in 2005 by the Roh Administration. It envisaged reducing the size of the armed forces significantly (by approximately 25%, mainly through the alteration of the conscription policy) and creating a modern, technologically advanced fighting force which would compensate for the reduced numbers and enable the Republic of Korea to project power overseas. The plan called for vast levels of defence expenditure, and assumed that the South Korean economy would grow at an average rate of approximately 7% per year between 2005-2020.

The Roh Administration's reform plans were based on the notion that the North Korean threat would reduce over time as his engagement strategy (the so-called 'Sunshine Policy') bore fruit, and the RoK could focus more of its efforts on the wider region. President Roh assumed that the carrots being offered to Pyongyang, coupled with the reduction in the South's military posture, would encourage the North to follow suit and begin to demilitarise. This approach failed; instead, the North maintained its conventional military forces and, in 2006, detonated its first nuclear device. A nuclear-armed North Korea was now a reality.

The Lee Administration revised DRP 2020 in 2009, and again in 2011. The 2009 revision reduced the planned cuts in manpower and focused the military budget on more essential systems. It was clear that the ambitious level of defence spending increases ($505 billion over the course of DRP 2020) was not sustainable and the global economic crisis of 2008 mean that 7% growth in the South Korean economy was unlikely to be achieved.

The 2011 reforms, named DR 307, were made in response to the North Korean sinking of the RoKS Cheonan and the North Korean artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong Island. These actions, combined with the 2009 missile test and nuclear test by North Korea, saw a shift in opinion by the South Korean public. They now saw the DPRK as a major threat once again, and the Lee Administration opted to re-examine the reform programme and refocus it.

DR 307 focused on preparing the RoK Armed Forces for regaining wartime operational control from the United States and addressing concerns that South Korea's demographics may cause shortfalls in conscripts in the future. It extended the scope of the plan, from 2020 to 2030.

DR 307 also sought to give the RoK the ability to respond to small-scale North Korean provocations and also to provide the RoK with a precision strike capability, which had primarily been provided by US Forces Korea (USFK) in the interim. In particular, Defence Minister Kim announced that with the proposed reforms in DR 307, “it will take one or two days for our military to destroy North Korea’s long-range artillery pieces, from the current one week.”

Following the North Korean missile test earlier in 2015, the potential withdrawal of US forces from the Peninsula and the questionable commitment of the United States as the RoK's major ally given, the Park Administration had seen fit to make further modifications to the plan. Named DR 310, the proposed changes include the following:

- An increase in manpower of the RoK Marine Corps of 4,000 volunteer personnel by 2020;
- An increase in the manpower of the RoK Army Special Warfare Command by 2,000 by 2020;
- An increase in the defence procurement budget of 10 percentage points (from 15% to 25%). This will occur in two stages; to 20% in 2016 and 25% in 2017 (see here);
- The procurement of a missile defence system, possibly in cooperation with Japan;
- Improvements in South Korean surveillance technology, including via satellite and UAVs;
- Improvements to the system used for mobilising reserves, including limited mobilisation at lower alert levels;
- Further procurement of attack helicopters;
- A increased focus on cyberwarfare and cyberdefence;
- Improved training for anti-submarine warfare, following the DPRK's development of a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

(OOC: Everything up to the stuff about DR 310 is basically an overview of South Korean defence reform from 2005-2012. Obviously the situation in-game has altered things once again.)