Turkish Security and Defense Review, like a Defense Ministry, but better

[Turkey (Dax)]

[[NOTE: This is not a typical Defense Ministry thread. For information on the Turkish Military and it's capabilities, please see this and other widely-available sources.]]

The Turkish Defense Review is a state-owned journal published by the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Organization (an intelligence branch independent of the Ministry of Defense, similar to the CIA or other such intelligence services.) The TSDR publishes articles, assessments, analysis, and news regarding security and defense matters in Turkey and the wider region, as well as external geopolitical shifts and trends which affect the region, directly or indirectly. Most articles are classified as sensitive by the government*, though the Ministry of National Defense regularly publishes information for the public domain on defense capabilities and procurement.

*All posts in this thread are to be considered SIC unless otherwise noted with "VISC" or "IC" at the top of the post.

Table of Contents

Developments and Tensions in Hatay
Turkish Air Force Fighter Fleet Deliberations
Major Procurement and Development Projects
Implementation of the Syrian border region's 'Humanitarian Corridor'
On the Free Syrian Army
2013 Military Reform Law
Purchase of the Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi
Operation Pasha War Plans

[Turkey (Dax)]

[[For context and background reading, please refer to Boxman94's thread here]]

Highlighted: Hatay Province

The bomb explosion at the Turkish checkpoint on the border certainly awoke some of Turkey's border guards. While not exactly unexpected or unforeseen, the ongoing repression and de facto civil war raging in Syria had thusfar failed to reach Turkey in a more intimate, direct fashion. Knowing, as governments tend to know, that it was only a matter of time before the conflict spilled over into at least nominal Turkish lands, this was prepared for to some degree.

The difficulty in responding to the bomb explosion really lie in the fact that it was incredibly difficult to gauge where, exactly, it came from. Reports had indicated that the bomb was likely homemade, and also appeared to have been detonated by a suicide bomber at a checkpoint controlled by the main Syrian rebel group, the SNC. The SNC was granted wide latitude by Turkish authorities to operate along the Turko-Syrian border for the purposes of internment of refugees and to regroup, coordinating strikes against Bashir al-Assad's forces in the south. That a suicide bomber had attempted to disrupt this vital process meant that all hands pointed at an agent of the Assad regime. Given, of course, that Ankara couldn't very well call up Mr. Assad himself and ask him (having, among other reasons, broken relations with Demascus some time ago) the Turkish authorities were forced to rely on shoddy and inconsistent intelligence from the SNC operating on its border.

Which brought us to Hatay Province. Hatay was a sensitive place, to be sure. Originally part of the Ottoman administrative division of Aleppo and lumped into the French Mandate of Syria, the province subsequently declared independence and, just before the outbreak of the Second World War, voted in a plebiscite to join Turkey. Of course, sleeping dogs not prone to lie, the strip of land had been a bone of contention between Turkey and Syria, the latter of which still showed the province as part of Syria on official maps. Today of course, the province was home to the largest refugee camp on the Turko-Syrian border, with refugees from Aleppo to Homs to Damascus flooding the disputed province in a desperate flee to friendly land. Of course, lesser acknowledged by the Turkish Red Crescent was Hatay as a major transit point for fleeing fighters, returning fighters, and weapons to and from the battlefields in Syria. It would make sense that Assad would aim to destabilize it.

The method of explosion was peculiar, namely being that it was a suicide bomb. "Martyr Missions", as they were called, were not a signature of Assad's attack or Syrian life; indeed, the practice was thought to originate south, in Palestine. Furthermore, being associated with religious extremism as they were, one couldn't help but doubt that even Assad's most ardent supporters could call their devotion religious in it's commitment.

Nonetheless, it was decided that in order to protect the vital crossing point for fleeing refugees as well as to preserve a major lifeline for the SNC (Turkey's preferred victor in the civil war) that the Turkish Army should respond unequivocally to the threat -- perceived or otherwise -- in order to preserve the integrity of the Republic. This way, even if the culprit were a rival faction of the Syrian opposition, the end result was a net gain for Turkey and the SNC.

And so the Turkish-Syrian border was locked down. Along the non-Hatay portions of the massive border, the Turkish Army was put on high alert, and border towns were subject to a lock down that, while not officially martial law, certainly resembled it. This had the added benefit of allowing the Turkish military a free hand with Kurdish groups elsewhere along the border, which they took advantage of with zeal. Random searches of homes, mosques, and other notable gathering points were widely utilized under the guise of searching for Syrian saboteurs. These often culminated with arrests of citizens with dubious ties to Syria and extensive Kurdish backgrounds. But alas, no stone could remain untouched.

In Hatay, the Turkish military took a more offensive approach. The garrison of border guards in the province was minimal under normal circumstances and did not generally constitute a threat to the Republic. With the bomb blast, however, defense officials in Ankara would send a direct message to Bashar al-Assad and his cronies: Hatay was Turkish territory. Infringe at your own risk.

ORBAT
UNITS: 39th Mechanized Infantry Brigade ~ Approx 2500 personnel
Equipment: 120 Leopard 1 Main Battle Tanks, 300 Otokar Defender Light Utility Trucks, 105 M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers, 36 M107 Self-Propelled Howitzers
Aviation: 5 TAI T-70 Utility/Attack Helicopters*, 10 Eurocopter Cougar Utility Helicopters, 1 Bell OH-58B Observation Helicopter**
Location and Mission: Deploying to Hatay Province. The Brigade's primary, official mission will be to aid in humanitarian and refugee relief. Unofficially, the brigade will also be responsible for training and protecting fighters of the SNC from attacks from the central Syrian government in Damascus and other rival factions within the Syrian opposition. This mission is likely to expand, pending the outcome of official negotiations with other actors in the region and beyond.
TOE (Terms of Engagement): Turkish military personnel are not to attack any fighters directly except in strict self-defense. Given the unlikelihood of coming under direct attack from any party, Turkish army personnel are to keep a low profile other than for sanctioned humanitarian relief efforts. Their very presence in bound to unnerve Assad. Provocations are not necessary and only counter-productive in this instance.

*This is a Turkish-modified variant of the Sikorsky S-70. It is primarily a utility helicopter, though is armed with air-to-ground munitions and can be converted to an attack helicopter in short notice.
**This will primarily be used as a reconnaissance platform. Given the short-range observation capabilities, it will primarily be monitoring the border crossing and communicating to elements on the ground in the event of anything suspicious or threatening appears imminent.

[Turkey (Dax)]

Developments in the Turkish Air Force

As The Turkish Air Force received the first batch of ten of it's potential 116 F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft, the future of the Turkish Air Force and the composition of the fighter inventory had been brought to the forefront of attention among the National Defense Council. The composition of the Air Force's front line fighter fleet had been the subject of intense political and military scrutiny in recent years, as political developments had temporarily called into question the planned acquisition of the F-35s Turkey had invested so much time, money, and political capital in. Given developments both internationally and regionally, the question of the Turkish Air Force's fighter fleet became cause for immediate concern, and a decision was urged as quickly as possible in order to secure the dominance of the Turkish military among its neighbors for the foreseeable future.

Two pressing questions emerged in the debate, both of which had been argued extensively by various factions within the Turkish political and military elite. As is the case with nearly all subjects in which military and political officials must collaborate, the passion of the debate was not lost. The first major question was the future of Turkish Aerospace Industry's involvement with the Korean KAI fighter project's development. The second was the procurement of a fighter aircraft to serve in the interim.

All things considered, the second question was easier to answer. In order to ensure that no gaps existed in the Turkish military's capabilities, the requirement for supplemental aircraft in the interim time between the retirement of the ageing fleet of F-4 and F-5 fighters and the introduction of an indigenous design, the Turkish Air Force required approximately 160 combat aircraft, in addition to the well over 200 F-16s already flown. Bound by contract to purchase, at minimum, 116 F-35 Lightnings, that left a 40-some-odd hole in Turkish fighter capabilities. The idea had been floated to simply procure additional F-35 Lightnings -- by far the Air Force's preferred option -- to ensure maximum maintenance cost efficiency and to streamline the fighter fleet. However tensions remained between Ankara and Washington regarding the sharing of the F-35's source code, a problem other partners in the JSF Program had also complained about. The lack of progress on the matter had soured the perception of the F-35 program with some of Turkey's most nationalistic of the pol-mil bureaucracy, and alternatives were entertained openly. The source code debate had already been lost, in the eyes of many, and Turkey had relented on its position in order to secure the 116 it had already prepared for. A further order would serve as tacit complacency in the face of what many in the establishment considered not only an insult, but a national security dilemma for the Turkish Republic.

Therefore, intense deliberations subsiding, the decision was made to process an order for 45 Eurofighter Typhoons from EADS to supplement the fleet in lieu of additional F-35s. While this decision represented, at its core, a political decision, factors such as cost were also included into the final deliberations. The Turkish Air Force would approach Italy about the procurement of 45 Eurofighter Typhoons, Tranche 3A variant.

With that settled, the discussion turned to the matter of the future of Turkish participation in the primarily South Korea KAI KF-X fighter program. Turkey and Indonesia had initially been approached by Seoul in an effort to garner international participation in order to reduce costs (Turkey and Indonesia were expected to split 40% of the development costs), and Turkish Aerospace Industries had jumped on the opportunity, while the political and military establishment were absolutely giddy with the prospect of designing an indigenous fighter of their own.

Disappointment began to surface, however, as the design and conceptual process progressed. Ultimately, the Koreans had agreed to share only a 20% stake in the project with the TAI, and included provisions for a limited sharing of technology, export, and productions rights. These terms were unacceptable to Ankara, and negotiations had shown signs of progress and stall before ultimately coming to a standstill. In addition to technical disputes, it was concluded that the KF-X program wasn't ideally suited to Turkey's needs, Korea and Turkey sharing different strategic threats and capability requirements. In Turkey's haste to join a potentially indigenous fighter program, the joint-development relationship between Turkey and Korea as well as the overeager defense industry had influenced the decision making process.

Thus, Turkey would be intent to start from scratch. The Defense Ministry was ordered to submit an inquiry to the international community for a partnership to develop a next-generation fighter aircraft based on Turkish strategic requirements. TAI and the Air Force were commissioned to draft the required specifications for a future Turkish air force fighter jet. The preferred international partners had already been decided, but opening the bid to international inquiry was a good beginning. The Defense Ministry had openly advocated for approaching Sweden's Saab, Brazil's Embraer, EADS, and Dassault. Despite this, all offers would be taken into consideration, including those from Russia.

Air Force Structure Altercations
The delivered 10 F-35 Lightnings would enter service in the 2q2013 and be based with the 7th Main Jet Base Group Command, located at Erhaç, Malatya. They would replace the F-4E Phantom II jets currently in service.

[Turkey (Dax)]

List of Current Major Procurement and Development Projects

A reference guide, mostly for me, regarding current major projects the Turkish Armed Forces are undergoing, as well as their estimated timetables for completion.

Turkish Air Force

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

• TAI Anka. An indigenous Turkish UAV with similar capabilities as the US-designed MQ-1 Predator. The significant difference between the two is the Anka is currently unarmed. Development on an armed version based on the characteristics of the MQ-1 Predator is currently in design phase. 10 delivered 4q2012
• RQ/MQ-1 Predator. US-procured armed UAV. 6 delivered 4q2012
• TAI "Anka-B" UCAV Variant. A combat-capable variant of the Anka UAV. Indigenous Turkish development. Currently in development; undergoing flight testing.

Fighter/Multirole Aircraft

• F-15C/D Bock 52+ Upgrade. Turkey is in the process of upgrading 30 F-16s to Block 52+ Standard. This will bring the total number of F-16s operated by the TAF to 300. All upgrades and assembly to take place in Turkey. All upgrades delivered 3q2014
• F-35 Lightning II. Turkey is in the process of receiving 116 F-35 Lightnings from the US. 42 aircraft delivered as of 3q2015. Deliveries to continue as follows: 3rd Quarter; 2016: 12, 2017: 12, 2018: 10, 2019: 10, 2020: 10, 2021: 10, 2022: 10
• Eurofighter Typhoon. Turkey has ordered a total of 30 Eurofighter Typhoons from Italy. Order placed in 2012, deliveries taking place at 6/quarter starting 1q2014; 30 delivered as of 1q2015
• FTX-Project Future Turkish Fighter Program, a Turkish and International project to design, build, and produce an indigenous fighter aircraft. Currently undergoing feasibility studies

Tankers, Transport, Aerial Refueling, etc.

• Boeing 737 AEW&C. Locally produced in Turkey, four 737's will be delivered as of 2q2013.
• Airbus A400M. Parts are produced in Turkey and then assembled in Spain. Ankara plans to lobby associated EU governments for the rights to technology transfers and domestic production rights. Currently, deliveries are scheduled to take place as follows: 2013: 1, 2014: 3, 2015: 2, 2016: 2, 2017: 2 though subject to change if domestic rights are procured. Order Cancelled. Singular aircraft delivered to be used for engineering, training, and research purposes.
• Procurement of 25 Embraer KC-390 from Brazil finalized. Deliveries to take place: 3rd quarter 2016: 5, 2017: 10, 2018: 10 with 50% of construction of final 20 to be done in Turkey. Option for 10 additional units to be exercised no later than 2018.
• 2 Il-478 aerial refueling tankers, fitted with western and, where possible, indigenous Turkish systems and platforms. Delivered 4q2013. Option for three additional units to be exercised no later than 2018.

Gunships, Helicopters, Reconnaissance Platforms (non-UAV)

• 5 EC-130J Commando Solo III Electronic/Psychological Warfare aircraft upgraded from current stock of five C-130 Hercules aircraft. Deliveries and training completed as of 3q2015.
• TAI T-129 ATAK attack helicopter. An indigenous Turkish-designed and built variant of the AgustaWestland AW129 "Mangusta", significantly upgraded and altered with Turkish systems, armament, and, eventually, engine. Currently under production and delivery. 30 'T-129A' Delivered as of 3q2013. Order for 30 'T-135A' variant to begin, 5/quarter 2q2015-1q2016

[Turkey (Dax)]

Implementation of a Humanitarian Corridor

Widespread, even eager, support in the United Nations for Turkey's initiative to create a 'humanitarian corridor', or a buffer zone, on the Turko-Syrian border had caught political and defense officials by surprise. Indeed, Turkish UN ambassador Ertugrul Apkan had approached the General Assembly with an attitude that was a mix of assertiveness and defiance that bordered on combativeness. He had expected a fight, namely from Assad's most vocal supporters, particularly Russia and China; and the Iranian ambassador had remained eerily silent throughout the discussion. The acquiescence of the General Assembly at large hadn't been expected by the political ad military leaders who were intent on implementing the humanitarian corridor, and presumed they would have significant time to prepare its basic structure.

Not so. Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and Russia were all in the process of deploying significant resources to the area, with little preparation on the part of the Turkish central government as to the capacity to receive them. Thus the scramble was immediate. The fund had raised $70 Million in direct financial contributions, $30 Million of which was wired directly to the Turkish Red Crescent. The remaining $40 Million was handled by the Ministry of Interior, which would hold the funds as an emergency bond to cover any shortfalls of supply or financial constraints. The Turkish Red Crescent had been operating in the border area for nearly two years, supported by modest, but sufficient aid from the central government in Ankara to cover the projected costs of its mission that it could not cover from its own financial resources.

With the direct involvement of the Armed Forces, the task's progress increased tenfold. Humanitarian refugee camps were established at 100km intervals along the 800km Syrian border, which were situated a distance of 4kms away from the actual border demarcation. These "camp headquarters" would act as the basis and centralization of aid distribution, with mini "outposts' existing around them in a 'hub-and-spokes" fashion as needed. Logistically, the challenge was getting aid transported from the two "hubs" in Anatolia: the Diyarbakır Airport and Air Force Base, and the Port of Mayden. For this, the Turkish Army would rely on it's extensive fleet of Black Hawk tactical transport helicopters (numbering over 100 in total, 50 of which were earmarked for the mission alone), and the Air Force's Eurocopter Cougars (numbering 20, which would mostly transport personnel.) Cargo aircraft, such as C-130s, were impractical for the missions due to the lack of airfields along the Turkish-Syrian border. It was here that Vietnam, Russia, and Britain's contributions would truly be felt.

The security element of the corridor was the most important, from a strategic perspective. The parameters of the Turkish mission was such that offered the Turkish Armed Forces wide latitude in controlling the security atmosphere in the region. No other military personnel were permitted within Turkish borders, with the exception of unarmed pilots from foreign nations flying their aid into Diyarbakar Airport. This gave the Turkish Army carte blanche in assessing the security concerns of not only the Turkish state (Kurdish opposition groups and civilian population would stand to lose the most from the mission, being tightly scrutinized as they were) but also of the Syrian opposition. Turkey made no real secret of its indifference in providing the Syrian opposition fighters safe haven within its borders, and the humanitarian corridor would allow Ankara to step up its material support for these groups, providing them with international aid and an international mandate for safe haven, admittedly unwitting to the international community. Here, the Turkish Red Crescent would play the unwitting victims. International aid agencies would be centralized in Turkish-designated parts of the country, while the Turkish Red Crescent would be given sole jurisdiction (and government support) to provide relief to certain regions where the Syrian opposition tended to congregate, especially in Hatay Province.

Hatay was a natural choice as a gathering point for the Syrian opposition and Turkish authorities material support distribution. Hatay was already under heavy military presence and control thanks largely to the bomb blast which occurred on the border several months ago. For "security reasons", international presence would be limited in Hatay, which conveniently lay in close proximity to Aleppo and Homs -- the major focal point of Assad's brutal crackdown. Additionally, having close ethnic ties to Syria, as well as its history as a disputed territory, gave Ankara further leverage to restrict the access of international aid agencies, while the local population felt deep sympathies and cultural bond with the opposition fighters. It was almost the perfect cover.

In defense of the humanitarian corridor in the general sense, the entire Turkish Second Army would be forward deployed along the border. The Air Force's 2nd Tactical Air Command would be distributed along the border, as well, while the Navy's Southern Flotilla would patrol the eastern Mediterranean coast.

Turkish Second Army
One division headquartered in Adana, another (significantly larger) division based in Diyarbakır.
Elements of the VI Corps in Adana had already been deployed to Hatay, specifically the 39th Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

Elements of the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command
Primary uses include the 7th and 8th Main Jet Base Group, based in Malatya and Diyarkabir, respectively. These bases are comprised of mostly F-16s, though the 7th Jet Base Command utilizes 10 new F-35 Lightning II. Also based are Eurocopter Cougars and CH-235 cargo craft.
Additionally, the province of Batman comprises a fleet of UAV squadrons.
Additional bases include Mus, which is mostly transport aircraft and reconnaissance platforms.

Turkey's Southern Flotilla comprises it's largest fleet, with the Navy's most capable ships ans aviation components based at Aksaz Naval Base in Marmaris.

[Turkey (Dax)]

The Free Syrian Army

Amidst on-going deliberation involving various regional actors, the Turkish Ministry of Defense had begun exploring the prospect of what to do about the various elements of the Syrian opposition taking refuge and root in Turkish territory. Ostensibly, Turkey was fulfilling the role of good neighbor and international actor by coordinating policy extensively with the Arab League, United Nations, and bilaterally with various aid agencies from Russia, Italy, Britain, and beyond. Privately, the Turkish President was meeting with the Saudis and Qataris attempting to formulate a policy of tacit, direct, material support for the opposition in Syria while maintaining the image of responsible, impartial, international actors. It was tricky, indeed.

The implementation of the Defense Ministry's touted humanitarian corridor, which spanned the length of the sizable Turko-Syrian border, had given a great deal of latitude to Ankara in influencing developments on the ground. The deal being negotiated with Riyadh and Doha would seek to pledge that weapons and support provided from Gulf Sunni monarchies would be channeled via Turkey. The Syrian National Council - the only semi-organized, quasi-legitimate political face of the opposition - was headquartered in Istanbul. The amount of leverage and influence Ankara wielded in this case was astronomical, and using it to the Turkish Republic's advantage was critical.

Which wasn't to say that Ankara wielded this influence irresponsibly. Very few people in the world cared to see Bashar al-Assad retain power in Syria, and there was widespread consensus that the Alawite dynasty had lost all legitimacy and right to govern the Syrian state. Aside from some vested interests, perhaps in Moscow or Tehran, there was very little disagreement on that. Whether the international community as a whole had the will or capacity to do something about it, however, was another matter entirely. Ankara, by fate and sheer geopolitical reality, was the exception to the rule. Having the geographical advantage, the military capacity, a vested interest in stability, and widespread international support afforded Turkey the opportunity to take the chances that the rest of the world could not in influencing the outcome of the protracted civil war. After all, the conflict was quickly turning sectarian, and as much of a risk as any instability in Syria posed for the largely ethnically-homogeneous Turkish Republic, the danger was exponentially more critical for more fragile Middle Eastern states, namely Iraq and Lebanon, while posing further risks to Jordan, Israel, and Palestine by virtue of proximity.

Something needed to be done, and if Turkey was the only international actor willing and capable to act, then act she would.

Transforming the Free Syrian Army

One of the prime advantages to the Syrian opposition that was unfortunately not afforded to the 'Arab Spring' revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, and especially Libya was the significant support from an outside neighbor capable of supporting the opposition politically and logistically. Even the western intervention in Libya did not halt Muammar Gudaffi's ability to massacre his own people, and the Libyan militias did not see significant tactical gains until the liberation of Benghazi. Having a base of operations from which to regroup and take refuge was immensely important and arguably meant the difference between success and defeat.

One of the big problems in post-Gudaffi Libya was the matter of the new state apparatus taking control over the various rag-tag militias which had been so instrumental in toppling the regime in the first place. Ad hoc, informal, and most importantly undisciplined militias presented a host of problems in post-revolutionary societies, which manifested in unexpected ways. One could make a strong case that such a dynamic was the prime factor in emboldening the Benghazi regional authorities to demand autonomy (even independence) from the new state. Other times, these militias do organize, but on their own terms, which often included subjugating the civilian government to the new military elite's whims. Iran, Pakistan, and even Turkey itself were prime examples of this. In order to avoid this, there was wide consensus that the Free Syrian Army, such as it was, needed to be reigned in; mentored, trained in a degree of professionalism, organization, and respect for authority figures and civilian government structures and institutions. Additionally, given the fact that the Syrian National Council was decidedly not representative of the wider Syrian opposition, and was arguably no more representative of the Syrian people than Assad's regime, the Free Syrian Army's association with the Syrian National Council could be a precursor to the creation of another ruling elite; a minority class no less authoritarian than the Ba'ath Party, and with military might to back it up.

Therefore, the Turkish strategy would be to maintain the separation of the SNC and FSA as separate entities working for the same theoretical goal, but not associated with one another in any other way. The Turkish Armed Forces would begin directly and strategically arming the Free Syrian Army, erstwhile providing training, salary, and discipline in order to transform the "rag-tag militias" into a semi-professional, capable fighting force under the tacit, indirect command of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Essentially, the 'Free Syrian Army' would become an arm of the Turkish military.

Naturally, this would be vehemently denied by the central government. The last thing Turkey needed or desired was direct reprisal from Assad's forces against Turkey proper, or undeniable evidence that Turkey was waging what amounted to a proxy-war against Assad's regime. Turkey would maintain its stance of impartiality, and do its utmost to preserve its image of responsible regional actor interested in peace and the halting of fighting. Turkish diplomats would peddle ceasefires, negotiations, and national reconciliation as its preferred courses of action, emphasizing the need to halt the fighting and reach national unity and stability. All the while, Turkey would ensure that the Syrian opposition had the means to take Bashar al-Assad down one way or the other.

Equipment Donated to the Free Syrian Army

20,000 Yavuz 16 semi-automatic pistols*
5,000 Heckler-Koch 33 Assault Rifle*
10,000 Kobra 12 Gauge shotgun*
2,000 Heckler & Koch PSG1 semi-automatic sniper rifle*
1,000 M-200 Carbine bolt-action sniper rifle*
2,000 M72 Light Anti-tank weapon*
500 MILAN Anti-tank guided missiles*
20,000 T-40 underbarrel grenade launcher (for use with HK-33 rifles)*
150 FIM 92B/C Stinger MANPADS*
50,000 Type III ballistic personal armor vests*
*Numbers are approximate

500 Land Rover Defenders (light utility)
300 M48 Patton tanks ("M48A51" variant MBT; Turkish upgrade similar to the M60A1)
50 M113A1 TOW (Essentially an M113 APC modified to carry anti-tank missiles, in this case the MILAN.)
400 M113 APCs (Turkish standard "M113A2T1/2" variant.)
1,000 M-19 Mortars (Surplus WW2-era un/mounted mortar. Up to 4,000 available as needed.)
150 Bofors 4mm Anti-aircraft artillery (L/70T ["Turkish"] variant. Surplus WW2-era mostly withdrawn from service. Up to 900 available as needed)

A vast majority of the equipment "donated" to the FSA was surplus stocks of Turkish equipment long kept in storage, or otherwise being withdrawn from service in the near future. (Exceptions are made for small arms and light utility vehicles, all of which produced under license in Turkey, even if foreign in origin; if Germany didn't know that Turkey was producing Heckler & Koch guns for use by the Syrian opposition, what they didn't know wouldn't hurt them.) Vehicles and other non-dispensable platforms would be officially 'on loan' from the Turkish Army and remain property of the Turkish Armed Forces. The reality that this equipment may comprise the future Syrian military was, of course, widely anticipated.

[Turkey (Dax)]

2013 Military Reforms

The following is a proposed draft bill which outlines the specific provisions of the Defense Ministry's proposal to reform the armed forces. Much of this relies on the proposed increase of the overall defense budget currently under mod review in the Military Help Desk Forum. If the increase is ultimately denied, the law will be considered to have failed in the National Assembly and will be altered to fit the moderator ruling. If the increase is approved, it will be considered to have passed as-is.

The Defense Ministry's draft proposal for the Turkish Armed Forces can be roughly divided into the following parts:

• Equipment Modernization and Streamlining
• Conscription Policy, Training, and Personnel
• Budgetary Policy
• The Free Syrian Army [SIC]

Overall, the draft law represents the boldest move on the part of the civilian government to impose it's authority over the military establishment since the enshrining of the principle in the 2010 Constitutional Reforms. Such reforms were seen at the time as required to bring Turkey in line with European Union standards for democratic institutions. Ironically, the reforms have been criticized by both liberals as being a sign of the AKP's increasing Islamist streak, and by conservatives who criticize the government's takeover of a national institution such as the military. Nonetheless, the Constitutional reforms paved the way for the reorganization of the military to bring the force in line with a modern, versatile, professional armed force.

Equipment Streamlining and Modernization

Army
The land force equipment is comprised of thousands of vehicles kept in service since the 1960s/70s by the military establishment. Much of the equipment is obsolete and requires replacement, while much of it is redundant in the face of newer acquisitions and domestic manufacturing. Overall, the following equipment changes will take place in the Army:

Tanks: All M48 tanks have been withdrawn from service. While 300 have been 'loaned' to the FSA, the remaining 1000 will be officially retired from service and replaced by the Altay domestic tank. The government has increased orders for the Altay to 1600 total to be delivered in full by 2017. With the arrival of the Altays, the Army will also be withdrawing the entire fleet of Leopard 1 tanks, numbering 400, to be sold to foreign countries or scrapped. The Leopard 24A tanks will remain in service.
Additionally, Turkey will be working to streamline it's fleet of M60 tanks to serve as reserve units. Turkey operates 1650 M60 tanks of a variety of variants, including the "M60T", extensively upgraded. "TTS", "A3", and "RISE PASSIVE" variants are also present. The goal will be to streamline the entire fleet to one standard variant, to be named the "M60T2", which will seek to incorporate all of the various features of the four variants into one superior tank. In the event such features cannot be incorporated, those variants will be sold or scrapped, while the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries will order an Altay upgrade with similar features. The goal is to bring the entire M60T2 fleet to 1000 total held in reserve, with the rest sold or scrapped. The new Land forces doctrine will call for 2000 total tanks with 1000 in reserve, a decrease of 25%.

APCS and Other Armoured Vehicles
The Army currently operates approx. 5300 armored personnel carriers. Of these, 1400 are the indigenous ACV-APC, 2800 are various M113 designs, and 1200 are indigenous Otokar designs. Currently on order are 1000 of the new, amphibious, indigenous FNSS Pars APC, with deliveries to be completed in 2014.
Virtually all of the M113 variants with the exception of the "A2T2" are officially withdrawn from service. With the introduction of the Pars, all will be withdrawn, sold and/or scrapped. The Pars will officially replace the ACV-AAPC, which will be delegated to reserve. This will bring the total Turkish APC count to 2159, with 1381 in reserve, or a 50% decrease.
Other vehicles which the Army operates are Tank destroyers, of which 173 modified M113s are withdrawn, to be scrapped or sold. The government will increase it's number of ACV-ATV indigenous vehicles from the current 48 to 200. This will bring the total to 250 vehicles. Turkey's fleet of 650 ACV-AIFV Infantry fighting vehicles will not be changed.

Other
Other changes will include the ceasing of production of all licensed MAN and Mercedez-Benz vehicles except the Unimog 5000 heavy utility truck. Currently stock are to be sold off, many to the private sector. Productions facilities are to be designated for use by BMC and Otokar for expansion of Indigenous vehicle production.

Aviation
The introduction into service of the Bayraktar-Çaldiran tactical UAV in 2014 will see the retiring of the Malazgirt Mini UAVs from service.
The Turkish Army Chief's decision to produce 300 more Black Hawk helicopters until 2020 will be respected, with the 2015 introduction of the TAI Ankoptor replacing All Bell UH-1H and Agusta-Bell Iroquois helicopters. In total, 77 helicopters will be retired and 65 Ankopters will be procured, with 15 designated for training. The New Utility Helicopter under development will replace all other similar helicopters except Eurocopter Cougars and Black Hawks. In total, 169 will be retired and 150 NUHs procured by 2018. The introduction of 60 TAI-129 ATAK attack helicopters will replace all other helicopters in service by 2018.

The Air Force

The air force will require the least amount of equipment changes, with only minor altercations mostly following already-decided modifications. This includes the procurement of F-35s, Eurofighters, and the development of a new fighter jet and indigenous UAVs. Other changes that will be made are as follows:

The introduction of the A400M into service will replace the fleet of C-160 Transall aircraft.
Additionally, Turkey will look to expand it's Heavy Lift capability and logistics capability in terms of heavy transport. In this vein, Turkey will seek to acquire the right to locally produce some or all of the C-130J Super Hercules, with plans to procure a fleet of 75 aircraft of different roles and variants, to eventually replace all of the air force's CN-235, C-130, and KC-135 Stratotanker fleet. The Ministry is currently entertaining prospects of holding an international competition bid for the order, and has set aside $$14 Billion for the project over a decade. A decision is expected to be made by the middle of the year.

Navy
The Navy will se no significant equipment changes aside from those already planned.

Conscription

The ultimate aim of the Defense Ministry's reform bill will be to completely eliminate conscription by 2018. The following policies to conscription will be changed:

• Mandatory diaspora conscription will be abolished, with the 10,000EURO fine waived if less than 25% of taxable income originates in Turkey, with the practice eliminated completely by 2018;
• Conscription Age will be altered from ages 20-41 to ages 18-35;
• Those enrolled in college or vocational schools can delay service until completion of education -- if an individual's education is not scheduled to be completed until after 2018, they will still be required to serve conscription terms when completed. This will be the only form of conscription left after 2018;
• Individuals without a college or vocational degree will be required to serve 9 months as a private, with 6 months in reserve;
• Individuals with a 4-year degree are required to serve 12 months in reserve or 6 months in specialized training;
• the Justice Ministry has deferred the matter of conscientious objection to the Council of State, and will cease to enforce conscientious objection until such a ruling is made, repealing laws against such acts in 2018 entirely.

Training and Personnel

In accordance with the "Force 2014" restructuring plan, the overall force will be reduced by approximately 20% by 2014.

Additionally, salaries for volunteer service will be increased in 20% over 5 years, a 4% annual increase. This will be a universal raise for all volunteer servicemen of all ranks that will take effect after 5 continuous years of service or 2 years in combat service.

Turkey will work aggressively to facilitate international cooperation in training, specifically from professional armies in the United States and the UK. The task will be delegated to the Foreign Ministry for negotiation, and the Defense budget will be responsible for its financing.

Budgetary Changes

The Defense Ministry's budget will be audited more strictly, with an audit and oversight committee being established in the Defense Ministry ranks and appointed by the President at the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Additionally, the bill appropriates additional funding towards domestic manufacturing, including expansion of infrastructure for the aerospace and vehicle sectors. The bill mandates maintenance cuts to account for the significant decrease in equipment and appropriates any foreign sales revenue to be designated to a Defense Ministry Fund, controlled entirely by the oversight committee.

The budget also designates $400 Million per year for five years to "foreign support funds", which primarily consists of the Free Syrian Army. It specifically mandates the government solicit offsets from sympathetic nations to mitigate that number.

Additional funds are to be made available as well to training, to be appropriated from a specific fund at the discretion of the Defense Minister, at the suggestion of the foreign minister (for foreign training with allies.)

[Turkey (Dax)]

Turkey to Purchase Garibaldi?


The Giuseppe Garibaldi, the flagship of the Italian Navy, is up for retirement by 2016

It had started as a joke, really. Commander of the Turkish Navy, Adm. Emin Murat Bilgel, had made the comment in passing. His tone, even at the time, was somewhere between sarcasm and a wistful, Wouldn't that be nice... But it had caught the ear of the Necdet Özel, the Chief of General Staff, who passed the comment along to the Undersecretary for Procurement, and so on. Somewhere down the line, it caught on. Someone had taken the comment somewhat seriously.

So that was how İsmet Yılmaz, the Turkish Defense Minister, found himself bringing the topic up to his Italian counterpart on the sidelines of the NATO commanders summit in Malatya. The two men had discussed the preliminaries, and Yılmaz faxed his report back to the National Security Council, making sure to express in the report how utterly taken aback he was by the willingness of the Italians to sell the ship to begin with. And so the NSC sat, copies of the report distributed, mulling over the idea.

For the sake of context, the Giuseppe Garibaldi is an Italian aircraft carrier. A light carrier, and the first of the Italian Navy. Commissioned in the early 1980s, when Italy's constitution forbid the operation of proper aircraft carriers, it was designated an Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopter Cruiser, operating rotary aircraft only. Though common as it was for NATO fixed-wing aircraft to land on the ship during NATO exercises, it was understood to be a proper light aircraft carrier in all but name. In the late 80s, it was properly re-designated, named after Italy's most legendary General, equipped with fixed-wing fighters, and declared the flagship and pride of the Italian Navy. Since, it has seen operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya.

Now, with the Italians mesmerized by their newer, bigger, more capable aircraft carrier, Cavour, the Italian Navy is hooked. Though still the Navy's flagship, the Garibaldi just lacks the same shine, vigor, and appeal as it once did next to the Cavour. The Italian Ministry of Defense had announced in 2010 their intention to build a replacement to enter into service in 2015, prompting widened eyes the world over and rampant speculation as to the ship's fate. Emerging economies and expanding navies practically tripped over themselves to find out what their chances of purchasing the vessel was. It was rumored that Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa had all inquired as to the fate of the ship before Rome announced that the ship would be transformed to support roles, most likely at least in part due to the ship's sentimental value making her difficult to decommission.

The same sentimental value had been why the National Security Council were taken aback by Italy's apparent willingness to part with the ship. Though, times of austerity and the declining appetite for overseas offensive ventures in European society would likely override such sentiments. With a reported $20 Million annual maintenance cost, it's an easy thing to cut. With that in mind, the sale to Turkey seemed logical, considering the growth of the Turkish Navy, the strong Italo-Turkish defense and security ties, and the existence of a military alliance via NATO.

Also agreeable were the terms the Italians would impose on Ankara politically. There was expected talk of the possibility of the ships being used against an allied state, or heaven forbid, Italy itself. (The unstated concern being Israel was so clear that the undertone may as well have been in Hebrew.) There was discussion of a more comprehensive military alliance -- separate from NATO -- being signed between Turkey and Italy; and naturally Greece and Cyprus were mentioned. It was rumored that the Italian Defense Minister and his Turkish counterpart had shared some heated words which eavesdroppers have confirmed contained the word "Armenia" a number of times. But in the end, it was agreed in principle.

Back channel negotiators had begun some unofficial, unpublicized talks on a potential sale, and the Italians had agreed, off the record, to hand over the vessel free of charge. Turkey, in turn, would cover all of the refurbishment costs, upgrading, and necessary fitting work, in addition to purchasing the ships complement fleet of sixteen AV-8 Harriers. They were replacing the aircraft with the F-35, so the opportunity to immediately sell off the Harriers was certainly welcome. (For a healthy up-charge, Turkish officials were sure.) Lastly, the Italians would require their ships be given first priority in consideration should Turkey need to expand its surface fleet to escort the vessel. The Security Council considered tossing in a clause to any deal that would see Turkey return the vessel to Italy upon its retirement, for use as a memorial to the ship's significance to Italy. A team of engineers was sent to examine and assess the ship immediately.

The ship would be 30 years old by the time of her sale. With a proper mid-life upgrade, she could easily serve another two decades in Turkish service. Observers had assessed that a full upgrade, refurbishment, and even integration of applicable Turkish systems would amount to approximately $300 Million, a reasonable amount. A further purchase of sixteen Harriers, even at a high-ball price of $50 Million per aircraft, added $800 Million. The purchase of a fleet of twenty naval warfare helicopters, at a projected cost of $50 Million each added a further billion, for a total of $2.1 Billion and an estimated annual upkeep cost of $50 Million.

But further, Turkey's Navy would have the have the surface fleet available to form a credible battlegroup to accommodate the vessel's role. The Garibaldi's standard battlegroup in Italy consisted of 2 destroyers, one frigate, one or two supply and replenishment ships (depending on mission), three landing/amphibious ships, and two submarines. While possessing no destroyers, The Turkish Navy did possess a fleet of eight GENESIS-modified Oliver Hazard Perry-class ships, four of which could be dedicated to her use until their retirement and replacement with dedicated ships. Further, six D'Estienne d'Orves-class ASW corvettes, two of which could serve in the same role as the Perry's. The fleet also contained 16 Ç-302-class mechanized landing ships, of which two could be dedicated to her use just until the introduction of the two LST ships currently under production. Six Type 214 submarines were currently being built, as well, to replace the six aging Atılay-class Type-209 submarines. Finally, under production was also two new Fleet Replenishment Tankers to replace the two in service. All in all, the Navy would immediately require a further order of two more submarines and one additional Replenishment & Support ship in order to form a credible battlegroup. However, the Navy would have to begin a process of modernization in 2016 in order to adequately complement her without sacrificing capability elsewhere. It was an ambitious project.

After 16 hours of deliberations, the National Security Council ultimately decided the offer as it was simply too good to pass up. The memorandum resolution authorized the purchase of the Giuseppe Garibaldi light aircraft carrier from the Italian Republic. It decreed that the Navy would sacrifice, with funding cut for the purchase of the following ships:

2 T-100 class frigates
1 T-2000 class frigates
3 Ada-class corvettes

Additionally, the project to build a new Helicopter Platform Dock, approved in 2010, would be cut. Altogether, the navy was able to save $2.5 Billion, $400 Million more than the estimated cost of procuring the Garibaldi. It also appropriated $1.2 Billion to procuring two additional submarines, and $500 Million for the procurement of a fleet replenishment ship. Additionally, the Navy thought it would make sense to upgrade all of the Navy's aging naval attack helicopters if more were going to be procured as part of the program. $2 Billion was appropriated towards an additional 40 helicopters in addition to the ones factored into the vessels default program cost. The total program would cost $5.8 Billion, minus $2.5 Billion in program cuts, for a total of $3.3 Billion. It also suggested the name of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The bill was submitted to the National Assembly, and approved within three days. The announcement was made, and the Italians were contacted.

[[SIC INFORMATION: The Ministry of Defense has confirmed and announced their intention to purchase the vessel. Subsequent outcome of negotiations would be published as they become available. Actual contract negotiations (including political implications and pricing) subject to varying degrees of official disclosure and classification.]]

[Turkey (Dax)]

Operation Pasha

The Turkish General Staff Headquarters had always had a dark cloud of foreboding about it. Considering the role of the Turkish General Staff in Turkey in the last century, it would be easy for one to see why. Located just about an hour outside of Ankara, the building sits in the center of what was once a large field in the center of a rather desolate, rural area of the country. Kemal Ataturk had built the headquarters in the early days of his revolutionary government, intent that the army's top generals should be headquartered in a secluded, retreat-like area of the country, not attached to official government bureaucracy or near to the watchful eye of the young nation's saboteurs. Resembling the English Boroque-style architecture so common of the time, the building evoked images of ominous institutions, portentous asylums, and villainous operations.

Which wasn't too far from the truth over the last century.

And it wasn't too far from the truth today. The gathering point of the National Security Council called together the President of the Republic, Secretary General Muammer Türker, both the foreign and defense ministers, and the chiefs of staff of the army and air force, which included the commander in charge of the Free Syrian Army's training and mentoring. The meeting was called together to discuss the situation in Syria, and the government's ultimate response to it.

The sense of urgency was almost tangible. The government had sat for weeks on the matter of the Istanbul bomb blast that severely curtailed the country's prestige and burned its hand in their role as principle sponsor of the Syrian opposition. The PKK terrorist that the MIT had uncovered was sponsored in turn by Damascus had escaped, presumably into Syrian territory unmolested, raising great fears that more attacks would undoubtedly be forthcoming. President Gul's ultimatum to Bashar al-Assad to hand over the suspect and accomplices (which, of course, translated to any PKK elements in Syria, of course) had gone unanswered in a bold dismissal of their northern neighbor and a sure sign that the Assad regime had no intentions of cooperating with Ankara. The audacious effrontery was a risky move by Damascus designed to test the patience and will of the Turkish state, and one which Assad would be forced to repent.

As a matter of pride and borne of a need to safeguard both the physical well-being of the state and its reputation, a response was urgently needed. The government had sat on the matter for weeks, cautious of an escalation of the situation without proper attention being paid to the potential consequences of an effective response. International aid agencies and personnel operated extensively throughout the Syrian-Turkish border region as part of the the government's humanitarian corridor, and the safety of international personnel was paramount so as to not degrade support for the mission or Turkey's role in alleviating the conflict from international partners. Before the start of any theoretical operation, these agents would need to be evacuated safely out of the reach of Syrian reprisal.

Politically, Turkey was loathe to present the matter to the international community. The justification for engagement was clear: Bashar al-Assad continued to commit horrible crimes against the people of Syria, endangering regional stability more and more as time went on, reaching unacceptable crisis levels. Spillover from the crisis had already reached Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and now Turkey. As if that alone did not warrant international intervention, the continual crackdown and intensifying civil war had led to a decay and degradation of Syria's internal security situation, creating a state of lawlessness and impunity in the country's more remote regions. Damascus' capability to police these areas diminished with each passing day, and the potential threats to order and security were intolerable. That Turkish intelligence had uncovered Assad's official support for the terrorist in question need not be disclosed or emphasized; that such an attack were permitted, and Damascus' obvious inability or unwillingness to secure its own borders and internal threats to neighboring nations required action to fill the security vacuum left in the Syrian Army's wake.

Turkey's action would officially be presented as a Limited Police Action. A limited-engagement security-assurance operation intent on restoring order to externally-threatening, restive parts of the Syrian Arab Republic that posed a great danger to neighboring nations. Turkey would also seek to track down, apprehend, and prosecute terrorist cells and individuals, particularly those involved in the 2013 Istanbul bombing. Turkey would commit no large contingent of occupation forces, because this was not an occupation. Turkey would merely be securing the provinces internal security by eliminating elements causing the havoc.

Officially.

The police action, code-named Operation Pasha, would occur in three stages: Operation Pasha would be the overall code name for the entire operation as well as its opening stages which would seek to test the Syrian Air Defense Command's capability and willingness to initiate combat operations against encroaching Turkish forces, providing important reconnaissance. Operation Marj Dabiq (Aleppo meadow) would comprise the second phase of operations, which would primarily be suppressing air defenses, if active, and neutralizing Syrian Army units that engaged Turkish forces. The final phase, Operation Selim, would be the insertion of Special Forces and commando units into select regions of Syria in order to infiltrate suspected terrorist cities and towns and disband cells.

Operation Selim would have another aspect, which would see the Turkish-trained Free Syrian Army units moving into selected regions under the cover of Turkish aerial and artillery protections to secure a widening of the buffer zone from Turkish territory and taking control of key towns. Aleppo, the major Syrian city in the north, would be the grand jewel of the operation, and capturing the city would be the operation's ultimate objective.

[Turkey (Dax)]

Naval Reorganization, 2016-2020

In keeping with the developments in reorganizing the Turkish Armed Forces to better reflect its growing role, in addition to consolidating gains made in realms of technological and physical capability, as well as civilian control over the armed forces, the Turkish Navy will be undergoing an extensive upgrade, reorganization, and reevaluation over the proceeding five years, to conclude in or around 2020. By far the single most pivotal development with regards to the navy in the preceding year was the acquisition of the Giuseppe Garibaldi light aircraft carrier from Italy (henceforth referred to as the Ataturk, to reflect the Navy's renaming of the vessel once it enters service.) With the acquisition of the carrier and the expansion of capability it represents, the Navy will undergo an intense reorganization and modest expansion in order to complement the fleet, optimize its effectiveness, and accommodate the inclusion of the aircraft carrier and its fleet. To start, the primary objectives of the Turkish Navy are as following, in order of importance:

• Protect the maritime territorial integrity and EEZ of The Republic of Turkey, including the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean coasts;
• Protection of Turkish sovereignty claims in the Aegean Sea;
• Protection of Turkish preeminence of the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles and Bosporus);
• Protection of the principles of free passage along major trade routes, including Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and Malacca Strait;
• Humanitarian and disaster relief and logistic projection of supplies for relief and humanitarian efforts.

Currently, the Turkish Navy is divided into four "Commands": a Northern Command, a Southern Command, a Fleet Command Headquarters, and a Logistics and Training Command, based in Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeldi, and Istanbul, respectively.

Before the reorganization, the Turkish Navy's fleet consists of:

• 14 submarines, all of Type-209 variation;
• 8 MEKO 200 variant frigates, 8 GENESIS upgraded Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates;
• 6 ex-French 'B-class' corvettes;
• 17 fast attack craft/missile boats;
• 16 patrol boats;
• 20 Minesweepers;
• 45 landing craft, 16 mechanized landing craft, the rest tank landing craft

Additionally, the Turkish Navy has in the works plans to acquire the following:

• 8 Type 214 submarines to replace 6 Type 209's, to enter service by 2020;
• 3 TF2000-class frigates to replace 4 MEKO 200 by 2017;
• 2 TF100-class frigates to replace 2 MEKO 200 by 2016;
• 8 Ada-class corvettes to replace 6 former French corvettes by 2016;
• 16 patrol vessels to replace all currently in service by 2018;
• 1 Berlin-class Fleet Replenishment Tanker to enter service by 2016

In addition, several smaller LCTs and LSTs were cancelled for budgetary purposes.

As part of the reorganization, Turkish Naval Commands will be expanded from four to five. Their names, locations, and official requirements are as follows:

Fleet Command Headquarters, Istanbul: 10 submarines, 24 Offshore Patrol Vessels, 6 fast missile boats
• Black Sea Fleet Command, Samsun: 4 submarines, 4 large frigates, 4 corvettes, 10 fast missile boats, 6 OPVs, 4 LSTs/LCT/LCM
• Aegean Fleet Command, Izmir: 4 frigates, 4 corvettes, 4 submarines, 12 fast missile boats, 12 OPVs; 4 LCT/LSTs
• Mediterranean Fleet Command, Iskenderun: 1 aircraft carrier, 2 submarines, 2 large frigates, 4 frigates, 1 Replenishment Ship, 1 Amphibious Assault Vessel; Misc. LCT/LST

Under this new arrangement, Turkish naval requirements call for:

one aircraft carrier
20 submarines
6 large frigates/destroyers
8 frigates
8 corvettes
28 missile boats
42 OPVs
8 LST/LCT
one amphibious assault vessel

Of this list, the navy is in need of the following:

4 submarines
2 large frigates/destroyers
-8 frigates
0 corvettes
1 Fast missile boat
10 OPV
3 LST
1 amphibious assault

Under the reorganization proposal, the Turkish Ministry of Defense has authorized Request for Tenders be put out for a new class of submarines and a new class of patrol boats, numbering four and 10, respectively. The Navy would exercise its option for an additional two TF2000 frigates/destroyers to satisfy that demand, and order the construction of one Kılıç II-class missile boats. Further, the navy would authorize the purchase of one Foudre-class amphibious assault vessel from France.

In the longer term, the Navy would explore the possibilities of partnering with foreign nations on the development of an indigenous class of destroyers based either on a modification of the TF-2000 or an entirely new design optimized for land attack and ASW. Additionally, a similar project would be undertaken for a new class of frigates to replace the Oliver Hazard Perrys in service after 2020. Lastly, a new class of patrol vessels would be indigenously designed based on experiences with the procurement of 10 foreign vessels authorized under the modernization program.

Costs appropriated are as follows:

Turkish Navy Submarine Tender: $2.4 billion
Offshore Patrol Vessel Tender: $2.5 billion
TF-2000 Additional Vessel Option: $2 billion
Kılıç class missile boat: $100 million
Foudre-class AAV: $85 million

Total Cost Appropriated: $7.85 billion
2015 Procurement Budget: $5.28 billion
Remaining to be taken from 2016 Procurement Budget: $2.57 billion

[Turkey (Dax)]

Operation Koruma

Operation Koruma (Guardian) is the latest iteration and variation of the Turkish Armed Forces' war plans to intervene in the Syrian Civil War in the favor of the Syrian opposition forces and Free Syrian Army. Recent developments had put the National Security Council's last plan, Operation Pasha on indefinite hold, with the operation's plan ultimately being shelved altogether in favor of a more hands-off approach. The ebbing of the Syrian civil war over the last 24 months since the very overt threat of Turkish offensive operations against Bashar al-Assad had eased pressure on the civilian government to act in response.

In that time, the Free Syrian Army had used the lull in violence to continue their intensive training, acquisition of firepower, and funding to prepare for their fall offensive against Aleppo. The quiet arming and sharpening of the Free Syrian Army was supported fully by the Turkish Army, with help from international partners, and the Free Syrian Army invasion of Aleppo had been extensively planned and executed with direct assistance from the Turkish Army and National Security Council. The plan's success was virtually assured; Turkish artillery had supported the invasion, while Turkish air cover had protected their advance. Aleppo Governorate north of the actual city of Aleppo had fallen easily, and the opposition forces maintained their hold on the territory.

What was not expected, however, was the release of chemical weapons by the Syrian National Army into the city of Aleppo. While such a development's political and strategic effects were disastrous for the Syrian government and FSA alike, they have been discussed at length and need not be repeated here. The tactical advantage, to contrast, had been made apparent in driving opposition forces from the city's limits into the more sparsely-populated northern townships, securing the regime's hold on the city at the expense of any semblance of credibility that Damascus still retained. The city was leveled, if not physically, then demographically, and the FSA's forces were depleted significantly. Point for al-Assad.

In a classic case of winning the battle bit losing the war, however, the response to al-Assad's chemical weapons attack would be severe, and would be the equivalent to the nail in the regime's coffin. Turkish military leaders and civilian politicians alike, concluding that the conflict had gone on long enough, caused enough bloodshed, and posed an immediate danger and unacceptable level of risk to the wider region and the Turkish Republic, would shed whatever transparent political pretense of neutrality it still claimed. Ankara would draw up plans to intervene unequivocally in favor of the Free Syrian Army, including direct military support for the remaining FSA units, as well as regiments from the Turkish Army's own ranks and a naval blockade on Syria's Mediterranean coast, including Russia's Tartus naval base.

The Turkish middle finger would be seen from both the UN Headquarters and the Kremlin.

[Turkey (Dax)]

[[A reference for me, mostly, as there's been so many changes in-game I felt the need to keep track.]]

Structure and Equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces

Active Service (ARMY)
Does not account small arms, minor munitions, or missiles

Combat Vehicles
[339] Leopard 2NG Main Battle Tanks
[1600] Altay Main Battle Tanks
[200] ACV-ATV Tank Destroyers
[650] ACV-AIFV Infantry Fighting Vehicles

Utility, Logistic, and Other Vehicles
[1159] Otokar Cobra APC/MRV
[1000] FNSS Pars APC
[468] BMS Kirpi MRAP
[336] Otokar Arma NBC Protection Vehicle
[403] 6X6 BMC heavy utility truck
[988] 4X4 BMC light utility truck
[5500] Unimog 5000 light utility truck
[550] Otokar Engerek Special Operations Vehicle
[9800] Otokar Defender Light Utility Vehicle
[148] M48T5 "Tamay" Armoured Recovery Vehicle

Artillery, Air Defense, Missile Systems
[1000] Panter Field Howitzer
[2900] UT1 Mortars
[600] T-55 Firtina Self-Propelled Howitzers
[600] ACV-AMV Self-Propelled Howitzers
[80] T-300 Kasırga WS-1 Multiple Rocket Launcher
[36] MAKSAM RA 7040 MRLS
[250] T-122 Sakarya MRLS
[150] J-600T Yıldırım I Short-Range Ballistic Missile System
[700] Oerlikon GDF-003 Anti-Aircraft Gun
[250] Atılgan Short-Range Air Defense System

Aircraft
[406] Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk
[117] TAI/Sikorsky T-70
[150] TAI Ankoptor
[150] New Utility Helicopter (indigenous design)
[60] TAI T-135 ATAK
[5] CH-47F Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopters
[12] Bayraktar-Çaldiran UAVs
[148] Bayraktar Mini UAV

Entering Service

Reserve, Withdrawn, For Sale
*Reserve

[1077] M48A5T1/2 Main Battle Tanks
[1645] M60T2 Main Battle Tanks*
[398] Leopard 1 Main Battle Tanks*
[123] M113 TOW Tank Destroyers
[2762] M113T1/2 APC*
[1381] ACV-AAPC
[1500] M114/5/6 Field Howitzers*
[4500] M29/30 Mortars
[900] M113-derivative Self-Propelled Howitzers*
[900] M55 Anti-Aircraft Gun
[750] L/60 & M1A1 Bofors Anti-Aircraft gun
[110] M42 Duster SRADS*

[Turkey (Dax)]

[[A reference for me, mostly, as there's been so many changes in-game I felt the need to keep track.]]

Structure and Equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces

Active Service (AIR FORCE)
Does not account trainers, minor munitions, or missiles

Combat Aircraft
[54] F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft
[88] F-16 Fighting Falcon Block 52+
[30] Eurofighter Typhoon

Cargo, Tanker, and Utility (Fixed Wing
[17] Gulfstream G550 Command and Control
[2] Il-478 aerial refueling tankers
[19] C-130 Hercules Cargo
[5] Embraer KC-390 Cargo

Helicopters, Miscellaneous, and UAVs
[4] Boeing 737 AEW&C
[5] EC-130J Commando Solo III Electronic/PSYOPS aircraft
[12] 12 MC-130W 'Dragon Spear' SpecOps gunships
[40] Eurocopter Cougar utility/SAR helicopters
[6] RQ/MQ-1 Predator UAV
[40] TAI Anka-a/b UAV
[6] RQ-7 Shadow UAV

Entering Service

[62] F-35 Lightning II Aircraft (All by 2q2022)
[20] Embraer KC-390 Cargo (all by 3q2020)

Withdrawn, For Sale, Reserve
*Reserve

[140] F-4E Phantom II
[7] KC-135R-CRAG Stratotanker
[16] C-160 Transall cargo
[52] CN-235 cargo
[20] Bell UH-1H Huey helicopters

[Turkey (Dax)]

[[A reference for me, mostly, as there's been so many changes in-game I felt the need to keep track.]]

Structure and Equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces

Active Service (NAVY)
Does not account trainers, minor tankers, or non-combat vessels

LPD/LHD/Aircraft Carriers
[1] Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Light aircraft carrier (former Italian 'Giuseppe Garibaldi')

Destroyers/Large Frigates
[8] TF-2000 AAW Destroyers

Frigates
[8] MEKO 200 TN frigates (various classes)
[8] G-class frigates (ex-Oliver Hazard Perry-class)

Corvettes and Patrol Boats
[8] Ada-class corvettes (T-100 MILGEM)
[6] B-class corvettes (ex-D'Estienne d'Orves class)
[16] Turk-tipi Patrol Boats
[9] Kılıç II class Missile boats
[19] Kartal class Missile boats

Submarines
[8] Type 214 AIP submarines
[6] Atılay class submarines (Type 209/1400)
[4] S-80 class submarines*

Amphibious Warfare
[1] Osman Gazi-class Amph.Warfare
[1] Foudre-class Amph.Warfare
Various Landing Craft, Ships, and LCTs.

Tankers, FRS
[1] Berlin-class Fleet Replenishment Tanker
13 additional tankers, oilers, etc. of various stripes

Aircraft
[9] CASA CN-235 ASW/ASuW MPA
[10] ATR 72-500 ASW/ASuW MPA
[50] NHI NH90 TFH Helicopters
[8] Eurocopter Cougar utility/SAR helicopters
[16] AV-8 Harrier aircraft

Entering Service

[15] F-35 Lightning II STOL aircraft (by 2022)

Withdrawn, For Sale, Reserve