Resolution on Providing Security in SE Asia, Resolution for debate

Ersin Erçin was a career diplomat. Graduating from Ankara University's Political Science Faculty in 1980, he had been employed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry ever since, serving as ambassador to Sudan, Syria, and most recently Brazil. Specifically as concerned his current objective in New York today, he had over the years served as Director-General of several high-profile organizations such as OECD, OSCE, and NATO, where he focused particularly on international disarmament, multilateral diplomacy, and security. Having also served as Turkey's representative to the International Maritime Organization, combined with his extensive experience in trying to get the world's major powers to sit and constructively discuss security issues, made him ideally suited to his most current mission.

Today, he would field a resolution that would address the matter of the South China Sea. Being, of course, the world's busiest trading area, the ongoing conflict and military operations in the theatre by the Chinese Navy had disrupted global economic stability and interrupted global trade patterns, which of course threatened everybody. The resolution that he had crafted in collaboration with Ankara's partners in NATO sought to authorize the deployment of naval vessels to the region in order to protect merchant vessels forced to take alternate routes through Indonesia - routes that weren't so heavily secured and protected from the likes of pirates and other maritime malcontents. Indeed, Jakarta had specifically asked for international assistance in providing security to maritime traffic traversing Indonesian waters en route to South Asia.

It was a tricky resolution that would explicitly seek to legitimize a NATO presence in South Asia, which would no doubt not sit well with some nations. Considering the nations that sat on the council, Turkey was confident that it could absolutely count on the votes of the US, UK, France, and Italy, being NATO members, and was also fairly confident of the support from Georgia, India, and Japan. Few hurdles were likely to be expected from Brazil, Tunisia, and Peru, though it was possible that those nations could have certain reservations. China and Russia were the obvious opponents, while Nigeria and South Africa could definitely be swayed if Beijing held adamant objections.

China, of course, was the key. Considering the resolution was a direct response to Chinese actions, western presence in the theater could be in danger of being perceived as a threat to China, whom would no doubt wield its veto to stop it. Though, China did have a direct interest in facilitating the key trade route, being heavily dependent on the flow of trade through South East Asia. Mr. Ercin was careful to craft the resolution so as to make clear that the vessels were not a modus operandi to interfere with the Chinese military. If China could be swayed in favor of the resolution, there would be little excuse for Russia, wary as they were of authorizing NATO operations, to oppose it.

"While the republic of Georgia fully supports the motion in question and an ending to violence, given the structure of this council, I believe this will be the greatest test of the United Nations since the Korean conflict. We must debate this thoroughly and come to a swift and peaceful resolution. I fear if we dont act that the lives of millions may cease to exist in a conflict that we can prevent from escalating today"

"The United States supports the motion and agrees with the Georgian delegation that beyond this the United Nations, and the Security Council, must look towards addressing this issue through diplomacy and specifically calls on the members of this body from the region to take a lead in this field, fulfilling their responsibilities to their neighbours as members of this body."

The United Kingdom supports this motion and calls upon all parties involved in this conflict to see sense. Diplomacy must always be the primary method by which nations solve disputes.

"While we support the spirit of resolution, we are not convinced as yet to throw our support behind it. By what measure can a NATO-led taskforce be considered neutral in conflict which encompasses a region littered with allies of leading NATO naval powers such as the United States and Great Britain? While we do not oppose their involvement, we strongly suggest any military force reflect leadership and contribution from other states, in particular the Russian Pacific Fleet.

It may be unrealistic to ask or even suggest the Chinese Navy is in a position to participate in such an endeavour, and considering their status as a party to conflict, we doubt many of the countries such a resolution is intended to protect would welcome a Chinese fleet. That being said, Russia is neither an explicit ally of the parties to the conflict, and has no commitment to a naval war which would sap her ability to contribute. In fact, considering Russian neutrality and relative extricable status in relation to members of the region, it might even be beneficial to seek Russian leadership of such a fleet, should Moscow and her officers in Vladivostok be willing to take up the mantel.

While this may not be welcomed by our friends in Washington, we believe it would be far more in keeping with a spirit of neutral intervention in the interest of economic stability. We believe this alternative maintains the laudable spirit of the resolution while reducing the taint of the perception of UN interference partial to parties or states in league with parties to the conflict.

I yield the floor."

Russia had been weary of commenting. While they felt that having NATO at the head of such a flotilla would only serve to further increase tensions in the area, especially if the Americans showed up with their massive bathtubs of war, they also felt that promoting Russia as the leader of such a flotilla would be seen as aggression towards China. However, when the Brazilians suggested that the Pacific Fleet be put at the head, Chukin and his advisers saw it as a chance for Russia to not only show off some new toys, but also to deny NATO further political gains in the area, and to insure that it did not become a force to stop the Chinese navy.

"The Russian Federation strongly protests NATO, a defensive organization of North Atlantic states halfway around the world from the conflict zone, being given command of the international response. We feel that NATO as an organization should keep its focus where its charter says it is, in the North Atlantic, rather than in the South China Sea. We also echo the Brazilian concern of neutrality in that many of the states opposing China in this conflict are close allies of the United States and NATO.

"Russia also strongly condemns the violence on all sides, starting with the military and civilian incursions into the Spratly Islands, and the Chinese counter. We urge all parties to return to the table of diplomacy, guarantee the safety of international shipping through the area, the safety of all civilians in the area, and stand down their military forces.

"As for the Brazilian suggestion of Russian leadership of such a force, Russia would agree to place the Pacific Fleet at the head of the naval flotilla stipulated in this resolution, given Indonesia and Malaysia do not protest. This would not only ensure the neutrality in such a force, Russia maintaining warm relations with nations on both sides, but also places the headquarters managing the operation closer to the area of operations than Brussels or Washington.

"Beyond the issues with NATO's leadership, we support the resolution."

Li Baodong, China's permanent representative to the United Nations, was placed in a very precarious situation. He knew that a Chinese veto would be more dangerous to China than Chinese approval, as the continued diplomatic backlash would be exacerbated if China refused to cooperate with the international community. However, he was definitely not going to let the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation anywhere near the South China Sea; he would definitely be forced to veto such a resolution. Still, he felt that he had a couple cards that he could play first, and gauge the reaction of other representatives present. If there was any sort of positive reaction, he could gain some ground; otherwise, he'd have to minimise losses.

"China is greatly regretful that the most recent incident in the South China Sea has resulted in such strife for the economies of Asia, and certainly regrets the use of force against its neighbours. Had there been a diplomatic solution possible to the South China Sea conflict, we certainly would have accepted one, and we attempted to pursue one during the time leading up to the conflict. However, the State Council determined that it should stay steadfast and simply wait for a peaceful resolution after the most recent attempts failed. This passive route that we thought would handle the Spratly Island dispute turned out to be a catastrophe that forced our hand, as the belligerence of the other parties in the South China Sea caused major unrest in our cities. We initially assumed that we could shoulder the burden and continue to play the passive game, but increased anger amongst our population towards the unjust actions of Vietnam and the Philippines left us with no options.

"The other representatives here must consider China's position, and understand that the issue at hand is not one concerning the islands, but one concerning China's national security as a whole. In 2012, Vietnamese monks sailed to the Spratly Islands, increasing the occupation of islands that have been considered to be a part of China's sovereign territory for hundreds of years. We sent an official protest to their government, stating our displeasure at their unilateral decision, but to no avail. Realising that aggression would not solve our problems, we opted to remain quiet, even though the Vietnamese government threatened to use the Vietnamese People's Army to enforce their will. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments prepared for some talks to discuss the future of the Spratly Islands, but the idea fell through, with no fault to either China or Vietnam. However, the behaviour of the Vietnamese government solidified our greatest fear, namely that they would be willing to use force to seize further islands. Brunei also made a move that year, but we again opted to remain quiet. Also, unsurprisingly, increased disputes between our fishermen and Philippine patrol vessels caused minor problems, but neither the Chinese government nor the Philippine government wanted conflict, so we dismissed the issue at the time.

"It has always been the policy of China for peaceful resolution to any conflict if possible. We were also bound by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which was a document that was adhered to for the most part for many years. Nguyen Dy Nien, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam in the year 2002, signed the document on behalf of Vietnam, and our Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, signed the document on behalf of China. We assumed that Vietnam would contact us prior to any sudden moves in the South China Sea as per this agreement, and we, like the other parties in the South China Sea, wanted a peaceful and stable coexistence. We assumed that the Declaration would enable us to maintain the status quo without fears of major disruptions, and for a very long time, the South China Sea was mostly stable. Much to our greatest dismay, in 2015, Vietnam broke the agreement, violating Declaration §4 and §5 immediately, and consequently violating Declaration §2 as well. It was an entirely unprecedented action that immediately created great panic in the State Council, as we did not anticipate Vietnam unilaterally attacking and seizing one of our islands. Xinyi Jiao, known internationally as the First Thomas Reef, was under our control and served as a base for many peaceful fishing operations locally, but Vietnamese fishermen entered and somehow rapidly constructed a fishing building on the reef.

"This alone was not cause for alarm. Rather, it was the ensuing implications that caused alarm, sparked largely by the Vietnamese government's declaration that it was fully supporting the fishermen who knowingly entered Chinese-occupied territory. In addition to their violation of the Declaration, stripping the document of much of its legitimacy due to one of the most major signatories unilaterally violating it, they collaborated with the Philippine government in planning for a rapid seizure of even more of our islands. I will present to the other representatives of the United Nations Security Council a packet of documents detailing intercepted transmissions and other communications detailing a future coordinated Filipino-Vietnamese assault on the remainder of our held islands. We do not know the reasoning for this cooperation, nor the reasoning behind the Philippine decision to, in the future, violate the Declaration, but it was very clearly an attack on China. Without proper casus belli, China would never willingly disrupt the flow of trade through such a vital international shipping artery, but our national security was placed in great danger. Pressure from our citizens, who did not know about the cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines, also did not help; we considered diplomacy in resolving the conflict between China and Vietnam, but based on their historical behaviour, and their attempt to purchase ships from us that would have no doubt be used against us, we decided that we needed to act quickly and hold discussions afterwards.

"As for removal of our forces from the islands we have most recently occupied, I must state that the will of the Chinese people makes this request impossible. We cannot relinquish control over legitimately Chinese territory back to illegitimate occupation forces, and nor can we agree, as a sovereign state, to force our military to cease the defence of our sovereign soil. We can, however, state that we have actively sought to minimise both military and civilian casualties, and that we will justly compensate all civilians involved in the conflict. In addition, we will extradite all citizens of countries in the region unconditionally, assuming that the countries in question request their extradition. Thus, in the interest of peace, we seek to return the lives of as many people to normalcy as possible, though the request to allow a NATO-led fleet into the South China Sea is a request China cannot agree to. We must emphasise that we are greatly concerned with the threat to our national security posed by the plans for cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines, and a NATO fleet would merely exacerbate our existing concerns. We seek compromise, but on the issue of allowing a fleet from a North Atlantic organisation into our waters, we will steadfastly refuse. Thus, China proposes the following amendments to the resolution at hand before continuing.

"First, China requests that the UNSC removes the three sections regarding returning to the prior status quo, sending a NATO-led fleet, and providing the NATO-led fleet with a United Nations mandate. We will not agree to this resolution so long as those three terms stand. Instead, we would agree to a condition that all parties involve cease military force, that China reimburses those involved posthaste and preserves the lives of any civilians in the area, and that China removes a large portion of its navy from the region for a specified period of time. We will maintain patrols if only to keep the shipping routes open and safe from attacks from non-state actors. We will tentatively agree to a possible patrol fleet led by the Russian Federation, should it prove beneficial to the lasting security of the area.

"China is, like the other members of this Council, greatly concerned by the South China Sea dispute, and would like to see a diplomatic resolution. I yield the floor."

[I made up the Vietnam and Philippine thing, and that was in the OP of the war thread.]

"The Chinese argument is nothing but a smokescreen. Blaming 'the will of the people' is hardly a valid excuse for violating international law. Even if we believed in this Viet-Filipino conspiracy, which Italy for one does not, resorting to military force is unacceptable, especially when a diplomatic solution was never out of reach. At no point did China offer diplomacy to Vietnam--which conveniently fits into the People's Republic's political aims. And even if Vietnam did break the aforementioned Declaration, reacting to a handful of monks and fishermen with a full-fledged invasion fleet grossly violates the principle of proportionality inherent to just war. Two wrongs, Mr. Ambassador, do not make a right. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea has been broken multiple times by all parties many times in the past. Do you expect us to believe that this time justifies the use of force by China and China only? And what of the reported attacks on Malaysian positions? Not even you have leveled any allegations against them. The lack of even so much as a pretext for invasion only goes to the fact that this whole conflict is nothing but an aggressive landgrab on China's part.

Furthermore, China's position with regards to the Turkish resolution is indefensible. Once again, appealing to popular fervor as an excuse for holding on to your ill-gotten gains is abhorrent. The Spratly Islands are not sovereign Chinese territory, their ownership is a matter of international dispute and one for the ICJ. The only ceasefire conditions that satisfy and standard of justice are the complete withdrawal of belligerents and a return to the status quo ante bellum. It is the ultimate double standard for China to refuse to stand down on the basis of sovereignty, and yet expect other nations, with equally valid claims, to acquiesce.

Indeed, China's objection to the first three clauses of the resolution effectively guts the entire resolution. This is nothing but a ploy to deflect the international response to its violence. China is purposefully attempting to weaken the resolution so that it can continue its territorial ambitions unchecked. Everyone acknowledges the need for some stabilization force to preserve international commerce and innocent civilians. Italy will join NATO and the responsible actors of the world to provide that security, regardless of who's in charge. This is not the time for petty turf fights.

Mr. Erçin observed the round-table discussion with an intent eye, assessing the context and ramifications of the policies being adapted by various nations. The Chinese proposals for amendment were, of course, beyond the pale, worthy of little more than being scoffed at, but little else could be expected of Beijing in this situation. The Russian approach - dispassionate, but opportunistic - was also characteristic. Moscow had no direct interest in this conflict, but the suggestion that Russia lead any such security flotilla presented the Russians an opportunity to flex their naval power and influence in the Pacific Ocean, which they would of course capitalize on. The comments from America and Britain were disappointingly generic and weak, and while Italy's comments were commendable and noble, they lacked teeth; France's silence was almost humorously disappointing.

Most tellingly was the lack of contribution from Japan and India, Asia's two most powerful nations other than China. Firm opposition to China's behavior in the course of the entire debacle would grant the proposed resolution legitimacy through regional consensus. Vocal Indian and Japanese admonition would absolutely change the tune of Brazil, and would be critical in securing support from other key swing votes, such as South Africa and Peru. Resounding Indo-Japanese denunciations would furthermore complicate Russian efforts to remain detached, while preventing China from commandeering the tone of the conversation.

The whole thing was a disappointing affair.

Mr. Erçin had just about given up on the Security Council before a thought struck him. Aside from its commitments to NATO and overwhelming interest in economic stability, Ankara had no dog in this fight. If China displayed a newly-found aggressive streak and used military action against its neighbors, that barely effected Turkey. Indeed, the Turks were willing to play their role of good NATO ally, attempting to rally the alliance to confront the Chinese. But if the rest of NATO's most critical members - Washington, London, Paris - weren't willing to assume the leadership positions associated with their global status, Turkey wasn't going to throw its own political capital at the subject, much less hinge its already complicated relations with China and Russia on some rocks in the South China Sea. Turkey's interest here was to end the conflict by any means necessary and calm the markets as much as it could. If the US and the rest of NATO were only half interested in promoting the alliance's ideals abroad, Turkey would not sacrifice itself for them, either.

Besides, there was another dynamic at play. The sudden act of complete, unprovoked aggression against its neighbors did more than rattle China's east Asian neighbors; it unnerved Russia, as well. There was no doubt that Moscow was extremely wary of the latest Chinese move, and involving the Russian Navy in Southeast Asia's conflicts may just kill two birds with one stone, allowing Moscow and Beijing to balance and contain each other. Brazil's suggestion, far from undermining NATO's strategic aims, may have helped to inadvertently further them.

"The Chinese proposal for amendment of the resolution is nothing short of completely and utterly inappropriate, and for any member to even entertain supporting the Chinese edits would be a betrayal to the United Nations' ideals. I shall not waste this council's time by reiterating the valid points put forth by the honorable Italian ambassador, particularly in reference to Spratly Islands not being internationally-recognized Chinese territory; popular sentiment and internal discontent being invalid defenses for breaches of international law; the strikingly disproportionate use of force; and other transgressions. These matters are crystal clear. However, in light of the previous comments from various delegations and developments on the ground, Turkey offers the following amendments to the resolution:
Amendments in bold

"The rationale for the addition of Indonesia and Australia to the flotilla mission's command is simple: the flotilla would operate primarily in Indonesian maritime territory, and Australia's proximity, regional experience, and naval capabilities deem it the perfect nation to contribute to the mission's implementation and command."

"The Republic of Georgia approves but fears our Chinese friends may still not wish such measures, we propose that the Russian Federation is declared the lead party in this coalition if Russia so chooses to join. We also propose that the disputed islands be placed under United Nations control and administration until the conflict can be peacefully resolved.

"Brazil is not convinced by Beijing's response in these halls to the resolution to support its position. We are concerned of the veracity of any alleged conspiracy against China, and even accepting this, we have no reason to believe China had any casus belli against Malaysia; this implies an aggressive or at the very least opportunistic motivation for action which we find unacceptable.

Our most pressing concern, however, is that China initiated such military action. War should be a last resort in the political discourse between states. This is one of the principles, spoken or otherwise of world order consecrated after 1945, and one strongly identified with this very body. While implementation has not always been perfect, and sometimes various peaceful instruments of international politics have been misused in order to shield or make more palatable the use of force, that does not mean we cannot seek to act in the present with the admirable principle foremost in the collective consciousness of Brazil's diplomats mentioned earlier.

As such, unconvinced by the case put forwards thus far by China and with our concerns better addressed in the latest iteration of the resolution at hand, Brazil supports the amended resolution."

“The United States is also willing to support the amended resolution and will maintain its offered deployment, presently in transit, under this new banner.”

OOC: Now that I have some time to address this too.

IC:
"India is deeply saddened by China's decision to ignore international law and regional stability in such a petulant manner, and even as we respect Chinese claims, we cannot respect their failure to even entertain competing ones. India's position on this matter is simple: there is no valid excuse for the use of force to seize what is, in the end, disputed territory. While we admit Vietnam acted foolishly, China's actions look more like it was merely ecstatic to have an excuse just solid enough to give some impetus for invasion. The speed and scope of the invasion leave little doubt that this was at least planned and explicitly prepared for, long before Vietnam set things off."

"With this in mind, the only outcome India will support is the return to pre-conflict situations. We will only support measures aimed at returning the annexed territory to those who previously controlled it. As such, we will support the revised resolution as an interim measure, as we recognize that a more forceful one would, by design, be unlikely to make it through the UN."

Turkey seeks to call the revised resolution to a vote:

The resolution has received "Yay" votes on behalf of Italy, Turkey, Peru, and France.
The resolution has received "Nay" votes on behalf of Nigeria.
Tunisia has chosen to abstain.

"Yay".

India votes Yea

Russia votes Yea

Georgia votes yea

Yay

Final Voting Tally

Yea - 10
Nay - 1
Abstain - 4

Resolution Passes

[[This thread may continue to be used for any further UNSC discussion of the resolution's provisions, especially including the specific makeup of the flotilla, the international monitoring of the POW exchange, and the resolution's legitimization of the Jakarta Summit. However, no changes can be made to the resolution itself.]]

Russia officially declares that it intends to deploy one Amphibious Assault Ship in an aviation support role and command role, along with three detachment of warships divided between three areas outlined in the resolution. In total the Pacific Fleet contributions to the Coalition outlined in the Resolution is one Amphibious Assault Ship, one Missile Cruiser, three Destroyers, five Frigates, nine Corvettes and six Minesweepers.
In addition we will be deploying one Aircraft Carrying Cruiser, one Missile Cruiser, two Destroyers, two Frigates and two Corvettes from the Northern Fleet, as well as aviation assets to assist in monitoring and safekeeping of international shipping.

[OOC: This is more of a shortened version of a larger briefing on Russian deployments under this resolution containing the key facts, rather than Churkin actually saying something]

The previously stated deployment of a Cruiser, Destroyer, Frigates and auxiliary vessels is confirmed by a junior United States diplomat in official briefings – all ships had been underway since the conflict began and were now assembly in Pearl Harbor for the final push into the area of interest.

The United Kingdom will deploy a Destroyer and a Frigate as part of the flotilla. We currently have two submarines also deployed in the region currently of which one of these will also join. The second may join at a later date.

South Africa will send 2 submarines 1 frigate and one supply ship.